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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the involvement of Belarus in European and regional 
security organizations with respect to its relationship to the Russian Federation and the 
West. Modern Belarus’s geopolitical situation, history, relatively stable government, and 
need to seek its own development path makes this case study distinct in terms of 
European security. To analyze Belarus’s shifting behavior, a comparative case study 
approach is used. Special attention is given to Belarus’s history and the evolution of its 
relations between the East and the West, with an emphasis on the country’s domestic 
events, cooperation with regional security organizations, and changes in its foreign 
policy. The research demonstrates that, despite its turbulent history and uneasy process of 
self-determination, modern Belarus’s foreign policy and national security posture are 
based on a commitment to neutrality and peacemaking efforts within Europe. Ties with 
Russia and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s Soviet heritage are two 
major constraints preventing Belarus from developing closer relationships with 
Western security organizations and the United States. However, current trends show 
that Minsk is becoming more open to developing relations with the West, while 
maintaining prudent relations with Russia, thus possibly serving as a future bridge 
between East and West within Europe. 
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For the United States, as a member of NATO, European security is of particular 
importance. In contrast with the United States, Europe is a very old and historically 
turbulent region with a prolonged history of devastating wars. This legacy manifests itself 
in the continuous existence of local conflicts: Kosovo, Crimea, Nagorno-Karabakh, and 
the Donbass just to name a few in the past decades, so security concerns are constantly 
present in the region. Belarus is not currently involved in any ongoing conflicts. However, 
if we look at security in the European region as the combination of geopolitical and 
historical factors, individual states’ foreign policies, and international organizations’ 
performance, Belarus presents itself as a valuable case study.  
Geopolitically, Belarus is a buffer state between Russia and NATO. Historically, 
Belarus tended to appear in most major military conflicts in the region either territorially 
or as a state. Belarus’s foreign policy was historically influenced by its strong neighbors, 
chiefly Russia. The USSR’s Iron Curtain distanced Belarus from the West, but did not 
decisively break cultural, economic, and historical connections with it. Therefore, the 
process of rebuilding cooperative relations between Belarus, as a young independent state, 
and the West is of interest for detailed study. Belarus’s activities within the context of 
international security organizations also affect European security.  As a member of many 
regional and international security institutions, Belarus energetically participates in the 
spheres of international security, peacemaking activities, non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, and disarmament and arms control.1  
European security organizations have a common goal to provide overall security 
and stability in the region. However, certain tensions between organizations exist, as some 
bodies can be viewed as “Western” (aligned with the United States or major Western 
European states as key actors) or “Eastern” (with Russia as the key actor). After the 
                                                 
1 “Multilateral Cooperation/International Organizations,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Belarus, accessed June 08, 2018, http://mfa.gov.by/en/organizations/.   
2 
dissolution of Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the international security 
landscape changed considerably, and the newly independent Republic of Belarus, just like 
any other post-Soviet republic, faced the security dilemma of balancing its defensive 
ambitions between the West and Russia. Today, the key features of Belarus’s foreign policy 
are neutrality, peacemaking, and stability. Moreover, modern Belarus has continuously 
sought Western support and acknowledgement while maintaining positive relations with 
Russia.   
Through the entire history of Belarus, its people have always suffered from control 
by neighboring powers and never had a state of their own until beginning of the 20th 
century.2 Yet, geographically Belarus is a relatively large country with a land area of 207.6 
thousand square kilometers and a population of about 9.5 million.3 Belarus is ranked as 
84th in the world for its land area and 92nd for its population, and is sixth for its land area 
and fifth for its population among the post-Soviet countries.4 Belarus and Russia have deep 
and rich economic, political, and cultural ties. Belarus’s desire to keep close relations with 
Moscow after the USSR dissolution was logical. First, Russia was basically its sole energy 
supplier; 90 percent of Belarusian goods were exported to Russia. Second, Belarus’s 
geographical position dictated a Moscow-oriented foreign policy. Finally, Belarus and 
Russia have deep cultural roots and a long common history.  
Belarus’s historical, geopolitical, economic, and cultural ties place the country in a 
unique position between Russia and the West. Despite the fact that in recent decades 
Belarus’s foreign policy has become more pragmatic, the country’s historical connections 
with Russia still strongly influence Belarus’s modern foreign policy. In the past 27 years, 
following the collapse of the USSR, Belarus’s foreign policy has been shifting between 
West and East. These considerations lead to the following questions:  
                                                 
2 Andrei Tsygankov, “Defining State Interests after Empire: National Identity, Domestic Structures 
and Foreign Trade Policies of Latvia and Belarus,” Review of International Political Economy 7, no 1 
(2000): 111. 
3 National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus, Belarus in Figures, 2016 (Minsk, 2016), 
6. 
4 National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus, 6. 
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• What drives Belarus’s oscillating behavior in the international arena, 
particularly the country’s relations with international organizations?  
• How much leverage does Russia have on Belarus? 
• How does Belarus’s security posture affect the interests of the West and 
the United States? 
After gaining independence in 1991, the country became a member of many 
regional and international institutions. It is one of the few countries that participate in both 
Western and Eastern security organizations. In its pursuit of balancing between the West 
and the East. However, the Belarusian government has periodically shifted the country’s 
allegiance toward various international organizations, alternating between support and 
criticism. Also, Belarus’s public self-presentation has differed over time and depending on 
the audience. Typically, this appearance has been more democratic and liberal when 
dealing with Western countries and more fraternal and pro-Slavic when dealing with 
Russia. 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will examine the involvement of Belarus in European and regional 
security organizations, notably with respect to its relationship to the Russian Federation 
and the West. As explained in the preface of this chapter, Belarus is a good case study to 
examine European security’s general patterns, such as confronting hostile power 
projection, dealing with multilateral security threats, establishing a balance of interests, and 
managing dependence on macro-economic factors just to name a few. The Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), NATO, and the European Union (EU) are the institutions to be examined, 
as they play critical roles in European security. It is worth noting that Belarus is a member 
of a number of other international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the 
4 
Eurasian Economic Union.5 However, to limit the scope of this thesis, an overview and 
analysis of Belarus’s involvement with these institutions will not be conducted.  
Belarus’s posture in the international arena organically affects relations between 
Belarus and the United States, which have been uneasy since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations in December 1991.6 Their evolving bilateral cooperation was 
interrupted by 1996’s referendum in Belarus, which amended the constitution of Belarus 
and gave President Alexander Lukashenko almost unlimited power at the expense of 
legislature and judiciary.7 The negative reaction from the West was addressed by 
Lukashenko in the form of temporarily expelling the U.S. and EU ambassadors (the U.S. 
ambassador was permanently recalled in 2008).8  In turn, the United States adopted a 
selective engagement policy and implemented a number of sanctions toward Belarus and 
its top officials, which further degraded Belarus-US relations.9  Belarus’s recent slight 
changes in economic and domestic policies eased the United States’ approach, and Belarus-
U.S. relations have been slowly recovering.10  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Relative to the events in Ukraine and other parts of the post-Soviet space that have 
received broad coverage by the media, Belarus’s foreign policy and its involvement in 
international security organizations have been understudied and are often overlooked. 
However, Belarus’s geopolitical situation is paramount to maintaining peace and security 
                                                 
5 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, “Multilateral Cooperation/International 
Organizations.” 
6 “Countries and Regions/USA and Canada,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Belarus, accessed June 8, 2018, http://mfa.gov.by/en/. 
7 Jennifer Widner, “Constitution Writing & Conflict Resolution,” accessed November 12, 2018, 
https://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/reports/belarus1996.html. 
8 “U.S. Relations with Belarus,” U.S. Department of State, accessed April 12, 2018, 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5371.htm. 
9 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, “Countries and Regions/USA and 
Canada.” 
10 Grigory Ioffe, Reassessing Lukashenka: Belarus in Cultural and Geopolitical Context (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 87–97. 
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in Europe: Belarus is bordered by Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, and, 
therefore, provides a natural buffer between Russia and NATO members.  
Modern Belarus’s geopolitical situation, history, relatively stable government, and 
need to seek its own development path makes this case study distinct from other potential 
examples. This combination contributes to the Belarusian government’s wide-ranging and, 
sometimes, inconsistent initiatives. Minsk’s desired foreign policy of neutrality and 
peacemaking often confronts problems in balancing the interests of all stakeholders. All of 
these factors make Belarus’s security posture an interesting case to analyze from the point 
of development and security in the region, and modeling possible future scenarios allows 
one to analyze effects on the broader European security landscape. Moreover, modern 
Belarus’s attempts to develop relations with international organizations are important as 
they may serve as an example of a peaceful and constructive way to find solutions in the 
service of regional security and East-West cooperation.     
Belarus also plays a significant role in the context of other countries, especially in 
regard to Russia. Not only does Russia have a strong influence on Belarus’s posture both 
domestically and internationally, but, in turn, Belarus’s behavior affects Russia. While 
sometimes the chain reaction remains between Russia and Belarus alone, often, Moscow’s 
responses to Minsk’s actions affect the whole region. Moreover, Belarus provides military 
support to Russia in different aspects of its defense activities. One of the most important is 
Russia’s large “Zapad” (West) military exercise, which takes place every four years and 
was held jointly with Belarus in 2009, 2013, and 2017.11 In addition to joint military 
exercises, two Russian military facilities are operating in Belarus: a radar station at 
Gantsevichi and a naval communications center in Vileyka.12 Neither facility is an official 
                                                 
11 “Russia-Belarus: Belarussian Military at Zapad-2017 Exercise Achieves Goals Set – Lukashenko,” 
Asia News Monitor, September 21, 2017, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url= 
https://search.proquest.com.libproxy. 
nps.edu/docview/1940529128?accountid=12702; “Zapad-2013 Strategic Military Exercises,” Russian 
Government News, September 26, 2013, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19290; “Russia, 
Belarus Kick Off Joint Military Exercise,” Xinhua News Agency, September 8, 2009, 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com.libproxy.nps.edu/resources/doc/nb/news/12A9E2B10BA1A558?p=AFNB.  
12 “Russia: Belarus Regards Presence of Russian Military Installations as Beneficial,” Asia News 
Monitor. Bangkok: Thai News Service Group, January 18, 2018, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1988172234/?pq-origsite=primo.  
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military base, and Belarus does not charge fees for their use by Russia. Notably, this 
arrangement expires in 2020 and it is unclear if Belarus will renew the agreement on the 
same terms.13  
Underneath Belarus’s apparent stability, however, tensions can be discerned.  
While President Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime has proved adaptable to many of the 
economic and political challenges the country has faced, some impending changes need to 
be considered that might affect Belarus’s status quo: Lukashenko is aging; a successor for 
the presidency in the event of his sudden death is unclear; and the country lacks a 
sustainable economic model. For Western policymakers, these elements pose uncertainty 
and unpredictability in Belarus’s international posture.  
 Belarus’s foreign policy, while stressing the importance of neutrality and the 
country’s peacemaking role in the region, is sensitive both to Russian interests and to 
Western attitudes.   Understanding the challenges and the underlying causes that drive 
Belarus’s behavior in the international arena will help Western policymakers in their 
assessments and decision-making processes.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The general consensus in the current literature is that Belarus is tilting towards the 
West, while seeking to maintain good relations with Russia. On the one hand, there is a 
common view in the literature that while Russian-Belarusian relations are degrading, these 
historically resilient ties are likely to continue. On the other hand, these scholars also argue 
that Belarus is seeking to improve relations with its Western neighbors and Western 
international organizations. 
This thesis’s first task is to understand the history of Belarus and the evolution of 
the country during the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. While the literature focused on 
Belarus’s foreign policy is limited, there are numerous articles and books on Belarus’s 
history, the country’s Soviet-era development, and the evolution of contemporary Russian-
                                                 
13 “Russia: Belarus Regards Presence of Russian Military Installations as Beneficial,” Asia News 
Monitor. Bangkok: Thai News Service Group, January 18, 2018, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1988172234/?pq-origsite=primo. 
7 
Belarusian relations. However, most of the literature on Belarusian history in English 
comes from Soviet and Russian historians, whose views on the history of Belarus differs 
from Belarusian historians.  
In this research, works of two Belarusian scholars, Petr Brigadin and Petr 
Chirnigov, were used by the author to provide an overview of the history of Belarus from 
the country’s own perspective. Petr Brigadin’s Istoria Belorusii v kontexte Evropeiskoj 
istorii. Kurs lekzij [The history of Belarus in the context of European history. A course of 
lectures] and Petr Chigrinov’s Istoria Belorusii. Uchebnoe posobie v pomosch’ 
abiturientam [The history of Belarus. A study guide for college applicants], both originally 
in Russian language and translated by the author of this thesis, complement each other and 
provide a comprehensive overview of Belarusian history.  
Monumental works on the history and post-Soviet development of the post-Soviet 
republics, including Belarus, are presented in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia and in the 
Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: documents, data, and analysis, 
compiled by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Sullivan Paige.14 Published in 1969-1978 in the 
Russian language, the third edition of the Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsyklopedia [The Great 
Soviet Encyclopedia] provides a Soviet perspective on Belarus’s historical development in 
volume three: Belorusskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika [The Belarus 
Soviet Socialist Republic]. 
The extensive collection of documents such as agreements, treaties, articles and so 
on, as well as tables and maps produced by Brzezinski and Paige at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies in Washington, is a useful resource for the Belarus’s posture in 
the post-Soviet era.15 The chief source that these authors utilized is the Foreign Broadcast 
International Service (FBIS).16 The book presents the evolution of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements among the former USSR republics until the end of 1995 and constitutes an 
                                                 
14 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Paige Sullivan, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: 
Documents, Data, and Analysis (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1996). 
15 Brzezinski and Sullivan, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
16Marcia Sprules, “Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data, and 
Analysis,” Library Journal, (June 1997), http://search.proquest.com/docview/196819486/. 
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important reference for Belarus’s early development and the evolution of Russian-
Belarusian relations.17    
Among other authors, Grigory Ioffe asserts that modern post-Soviet Belarus is 
getting more and more Western-oriented, while simultaneously viewing Russia as an 
historical ally and friend.18 One of the most prominent and informed observers of Belarus 
and its president Lukashenko, Ioffe, in his multiple publications asserts that Lukashenko’s 
policies, both foreign and domestic, have historically reflected Belarusian ties with 
Russia.19 However, Lukashenko’s warmth towards his powerful neighbor looked different 
in the1990s.20 At the beginning of his reign, Lukashenko had great ambitions about a 
Belarusian-Russian union and mutual cooperation across the political-social-economic 
spectrum.  But, over time, his enthusiasm has degraded due to multiple disputes and 
misunderstandings between himself and Putin. With the loss of strong support from Russia, 
Lukashenko has been looking towards the West with much more interest.   
Artyom Shraibman believes that Belarus’s recent focus on becoming the world’s 
peacemaker is an attempt to establish a desired balance between the West and Russia for 
the country.21 Starting with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Lukashenko’s 
regime had offered Minsk as a site for peacemaking negotiations.22 After hosting Russian-
Ukrainian negotiations, Belarus suggested that talks on the resolution of the Nagorny 
Karabakh conflict could take place in Minsk as well.23 Furthermore, Lukashenko and 
Belarus’s top officials are promoting an ambitious idea to host Helsinki-2 process.24 As a 
journalist and political commentator specializing in Belarus’s foreign and domestic 
                                                 
17 Brzezinski and Sullivan, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
18 Grigory Ioffe, “Understanding Belarus: Belarusian Identity,” Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 8 (2003): 
1241–272. http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/3594506. 
19 Ioffe, “Understanding Belarus: Belarusian Identity.” 
20 Ioffe. 
21 Artyom Shraibman, “V Pogone za Nishej. Pochemu Minsk Sdelal Mirotvorchestvo Osnovoj 
Vneshnej Politiki” [In Pursuit of Niche. Why Minsk Made the Peacemaking a Basis of Its Foreign Policy], 
May 28, 2018, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/76455 (translated by the author).  




politics, Shraibman suggests that the “peacemaking role allows Lukashenko to align what 
was irreconcilable before--the West’s recognition and authoritarianism; [and] participation 
in a few agreements with Russia while having a different position from Russia in foreign 
policy.”25 Minsk’s maneuvering behavior has now become expected rather than 
annoying.26   
Shraibman further asserts that Belarusian politics have undergone three significant 
changes.27 First, Belarus notably boosted its self-identity through domestic and foreign 
affairs.28 At home, Belarus’s independence and national identity are being cultivated; 
abroad, Belarus’s foreign policy portrays, along with its independence, the country’s 
interest in maintaining a neutral, peace-oriented position between the West and Russia.29 
Second, Belarus’s foreign policy is affected by its declining economic relations with 
Moscow.30 Lukashenko’s interest in Eurasian economic integration has faded and is being 
replaced with the more enthusiastic steps towards the West, as he seeks greater financial 
stability for his country.31 Finally, Belarusian citizens, while generally pro-Russian, place 
their independence and newly found national identity above Russia’s domestic and foreign 
interests.32  
Vladimir Socor’s expert observations reiterate Belarus’s complex relations with 
international security organizations. A senior Fellow of the Jamestown Foundation in 
Washington and its flagship publication, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Socor provides skilled 
analysis of Belarusian, Russian, and Western policies.33 His analytical articles in the realm of 
                                                 
25 Shraibman. 
26 Shraibman. 
27 Artyom Shraibman, “The House That Lukashenko Built. The Foundation, Evolution, and Future of 
the Belarusian Regime,” April 2018, https://carnegie.ru/2018/04/12/house-that-lukashenko-built-
foundation-evolution-and-future-of-belarusian-regime-pub-76059.   





33 “Contributors/Vladimir Socor,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, accessed June 7, 2018, 
https://www.fpri.org/contributor/vladimir-socor/. 
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regional security concerns, chiefly on NATO, OSCE, and EU policies and programs, provide 
an important perspective on Belarus’s behavior in the international arena.  
An alternative view on Russian-Belarusian relations is that the political and 
economic influence of Moscow is preventing Minsk from “Westernizing.” One proponent 
of this view is Thomas Ambrosio, an associate professor of political science at North 
Dakota State University.34 He argues that, despite the existing tensions between Putin and 
Lukashenko, relations between two countries and the emergence of the Union State of 
Belarus and Russia are a political success.35 The Agreement on the Establishment of the 
Union State of Belarus and Russia was signed on 8 December 1999 by the heads of state 
and laid out a legal basis for Belarus’s and Russia’s gradual integration process.36 Putin 
benefits from the Russian-Belarusian alliance by preventing Belarus from becoming a 
Western democratic country, thus protecting his borders from further NATO expansion 
and spread of democracy.37 Lukashenko, in turn, is able to run the country without political 
and economic reforms, and preserve his dictatorial regime.  In this way, political and 
economic support from Russia helps Lukashenko to stay in power.38  
Such a view provides an important perspective on Russian-Belarusian relations, but 
is controversial. On the one hand, this opinion might seem outdated.  The Union State of 
Belarus and Russia is no longer very active and does not provide meaningful benefits to 
either side. Additionally, Lukashenko’s recent warmth towards West is undeniable. On the 
other hand, as recently as November 2017, President Lukashenko, during the meeting with 
the governor of Kalinigrad region, said: “We [Belarus and Russia] are not strangers, we 
share the same homeland. We do not divide Russia and Belarus by borders but we try to 
                                                 
34 Thomas Ambrosio, “The Political Success of Russia-Belarus Relations: Insulating Minsk from a 
Color Revolution,” Demokratizatsiya 14 (3), (2006): 407–434.  
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build something new--we call it the Union State [of Belarus and Russia].”39 Thus, perhaps 
the Union State might regain its influence and importance in the region at some point.  
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The fundamentals of Lukashenko’s foreign policy can be drawn from his speech 
during the meeting with Central European Initiative’s foreign ministers: “For our country, 
it is equally important to develop cooperation with the East and the West and not to make 
an artificial choice between them.”40 Over the past decades, the focus has shifted back and 
forth between the West and the East, and the trend in foreign policy of portraying Belarus 
as a neutral and peaceful state was established. In the security sphere, Belarus favors a 
pragmatic approach of simultaneous dependence on the Russian military and cooperation 
with Western security organizations.    
On the face of it, the most plausible explanations suggest that three major factors 
have affected modern Belarus’s political posture. First, historically, Russian foreign and 
domestic policies have had a strong influence on Belarus’s behavior in the international 
arena and has pushed Belarus toward the East. Second, the unreformed economy has 
created financial difficulties in the domestic sector that have driven Lukashenko to seek 
for commerce and export alternatives to Russia globally. Third, sanctions by the West 
posed on Belarus for international legal violations, particularly in the area of human rights, 
and the unwillingness of Soviet-minded Lukashenko to Westernize Belarus, compel the 
Belarusian leader to pursue support from Russia.  
Russia’s activities, both domestically and internationally, heavily influence 
Belarus’s behavior. Russia’s aggressiveness toward the West makes Minsk very cautious 
in forming Belarus’s policies and in publicizing its official views on points of tension 
between Russia and the West. The Crimean crisis is one of the most recent conflicts that 
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made Minsk very uncomfortable. Lukashenko did not support Russia’s aggression in 
Ukraine, saying during a speech on 22 April 2014 at the Belarus Parliament: “I did not like 
it.”41 However, during the same speech he insinuated that Ukraine is partly to blame: 
“Ukraine ‘gave up Crimea without a fight’ because it does not consider the territory as its 
own.”42 During several interviews and speeches later on, Lukashenko asserted that Crimea 
is de facto Russian territory.43 On the one hand, this fence-sitting by Lukashenko about the 
Russian annexation of Crimea shows his efforts not to upset either the West or Russia. On 
the other hand, such a position portrays Belarus as a neutral state, which seeks peacemaking 
in the region by non-aggressive means. 
Much-needed Belarusian economic reforms have still not been enacted. 
Lukashenko, when he came to power in 1994, introduced a deviation from the former 
Soviet Union’s planned economy called “market socialism.”44 The idea of market 
socialism was a mixture of private and state ownership. Lukashenko slowed the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)-demanded reforms, including the privatization 
program.45 This has led to an economy with a large and stagnating state-led sector. Yet 
Russia continues to support Belarus through low oil prices and financial support.46 During 
the April 2017 meeting between Lukashenko and Putin, after the prolonged debates over 
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gas and oil prices, an agreement was reached not only on energy prices and supplies, but 
also on a 1 billion USD loan.47 Belarus’s continued deep financial dependence on Russia 
is a matter of concern for Lukashenko and is the reason for his pursuit of alternatives to 
sustain his country’s economy.   
Western criticism of Lukashenko’s “last dictatorship in Europe,” and political and 
economic sanctions that the United States and the EU imposed on Belarus, are viewed by 
Minsk as overly harsh and unfair.48 Despite Western views of the Belarusian president as 
a dictator, Lukashenko receives public support from many Belarusian citizens, and the 
opposition in the country is weak and unpopular.49 Human rights violations by the 
Belarusian government, while silenced domestically, have triggered a harsh reaction from 
the West in the form of political isolation and economic sanctions. However, when 
compared to the rest of the post-Soviet space, Belarus’s violations do not represent 
unprecedented humanitarian disasters; the penalties posed by the West, nevertheless, are 
exclusive to Belarus (perhaps because of its proximity to NATO and the EU).50 Despite 
these reactions from the West, which are perceived by Belarus as unjust, Minsk is still 
trying to reduce its dependence on Russia and is seeking to develop closer relations with 
European organizations.  
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To analyze Belarus’s shifting behavior, a comparative case study methodological 
approach will be used. Belarus’s participation in Western-led versus Russian-led security 
organizations will be compared through Belarus’s level of involvement, level of 
cooperation, formal opinions, and informal comments. Belarusian official statements, 
reports, and public opinion will be evaluated to determine their Western or Eastern 
inclination in relation to certain international security organizations. Additionally, these 
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analyses will provide clarity on Minsk’s public standing versus private attitudes and hidden 
support of opposition to certain issues.    
The available literature, including the current press, will be scrutinized. Many 
Western scholars have written studies on Belarus’s history and the country’s course under 
Lukashenko’s rule in the early 2000s. For example, Britain’s ambassador to Minsk in 2003-
2007, Brian Bennett, relies on his own experiences in describing and analyzing The last 
dictatorship in Europe: Belarus under Lukashenko, a book published in 2011.51 In the same 
year, Andrew Wilson, an award-winning journalist and author, published a book on 
Belarus’s origins, history, and post-Soviet evolution.52  
The content of the official websites of various international security organizations 
will also be utilized in the analysis. Moreover, reports on interviews with Belarus’s 
president, top Belarusian officials, as well as interviews with officials from international 
security organization will be examined to develop a better understanding of Minsk’s 
behavior. A number of online informational agencies provide a wealth of raw material for 
analysis as well, including original interviews and speeches from top Belarusian, Russian, 
and Western officials. Asia News Monitor, Belapan news agency, Belarus Independent 
News, Belarusian Telegraph Agency, Sputnik News Agency, RIA News, and Xinhua News 
Agency are a few venues most relevant to the thesis. The Jamestown Foundation Journal 
also offers reliable and most up to date articles on Belarus, Russia, and their 
interconnections. The European Council on Foreign Relations journal is another reliable 
source of information and analytical articles with European perspective. Russian and 
Belarusian security journals and magazines, published in Russian language will be 
analyzed as they present valuable Eastern-oriented perspective on the security in the region.   
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G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis will be organized by chapters, correlating with Belarus’s Western and 
Eastern inclinations. After the introduction, the second chapter will provide a brief history 
of Belarus and the country’s Soviet developments. The third chapter will be devoted to 
analysis of Russian-Belarusian relations after the collapse of Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991 
and Belarus’s involvement with the CSTO.53 The fourth chapter will be devoted to 
Belarus’s involvement and cooperation with Western security organizations, such as the 
OSCE, NATO, and EU. Finally, the fifth chapter, will focus on an analysis of Belarusian 
policy motivations, trends, and possible future directions, as well as how Belarusian 
policies may affect the United States and NATO.  
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II. BELARUS BEFORE LUKASHENKO: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
In order to understand modern Belarus, it is important to first outline the country’s 
origins. Knowing history helps the observer to comprehend causes of modern events and 
makes it easier to analyze and assess the country’s history. Belarus has a long history, and 
its population consolidation and development of socio-economic and political institutions 
took place in line with Eastern Slavic and pan-European civilizations.54 What makes 
Belarus’s history unique is that, until 1991, the country always was under the rule of 
another power: historically, Russians and Poles had the most influence on the country’s 
developments. Thus, the tensions in Belarus’s place between the East and the West existed 
over the course of history. Also, the country saw numerous devastating wars with enormous 
human losses. Such a dramatic development reflected on Belarusian national identity and, 
in turn, shapes Belarus’s modern foreign policy.  
A. BELARUS’S ORIGINS 
The Belarusian people started to form when Slavic tribes arrived to Europe and 
settled on modern Belarus’s lands along with Baltic and other Finno-Ugric tribes.55 
However, the first signs of primitive people are about one hundred thousand years old, and 
active inhabitation of the area started in the late Paleolithic era.56 Indo-European tribes 
reached modern Belarus’s lands at the turn of third and second millenniums B.C.57 In the 
6th century Slavic tribes had encroached on eastern European lands, in the process divided 
into the Eastern, Western, and Southern Slavic groups.58 The Eastern Slavic tribes are the 
ancestors of Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians.59  
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In the tenth century, the Kyivan Rus was established, which is commonly viewed 
as a chronological starting point for the mutual cultural and historical developments of the 
Russian, Belarussian, and Ukrainian nations.60 Kyivan Rus was a large empire of the 
unified princedoms ruled by the Scandinavian princes of the Rurikid dynasty.61 The head 
of the state was the grand duke of Kyiv, who resided in the capital of the state Kyiv.62 
Prince Volodimir, grand duke of Kyiv (980–1015), introduced Byzantine Christianity as 
the official religion of Kyivan Rus.63 Religion strengthened unity of the state, shaped a 
shared vision of the world, moral values and norms, helped establish certain behavioral 
trails, and enhanced the cultural development of Eastern Slavs.64  
Under the conditions of economic development, the growth of cities, and progress 
in trade, the politico-economic amalgamations (or principalities) of Polotsk–Minsk, 
Galicia–Volhynia, and Vladimir–-Suzdal were formed, which prompted the consolidation 
of the Belarusian, Ukrainian, and Russian nationalities, respectively.65 Belarusian, along 
with Ukrainian and Russian, nationalities developments took place during the 13th-16th 
centuries.66 The distinguishing feature of these nations’ developments was that the 
inhabitants of each principality shared a common language, religion, cultural heritage, 
traditions, customs, and ceremonies and, therefore, enjoyed brotherhood-like feelings 
towards each other.67 However, the Mongol invasion of 1237–40, which ended the Kyivan 
Rus, was a turning point in the disintegration of the three nationalities.68 On the one hand, 
the invasion brought Northern Slavs under Mongol rule for the next three hundred years; 
                                                 
60 Serhii Plokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1.  
61 Plokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations, 13. 
62 Brigadin, Istoria Belorusii v Kontexte Evropeiskoj Istorii. Kurs Lekzij, 35. 
63 Plokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations, 13.  
64 Brigadin, Istoria Belorusii v Kontexte Evropeiskoj Istorii. Kurs Lekzij, 42.  
65 Chigrinov, Istoria Belorusii. Uchebnoe Posobie v Pomosch’ Abiturientam, 14–15.  
66 Chigrinov, 15. 
67 Chigrinov, 15. 
68 Plokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations, 50. 
19 
on the other hand, the rest of the Rus territory came under the control of Lithuanian and 
Polish rulers.69  
In the 13th century, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) was formed, which 
shaped Belarusians as a distinctive nation.70 Founded by Lithuanian Grand Duke Mindovg 
(Mindaugas), the state further expanded under the rule of Grand Dukes Gediminas and his 
son Algirdas, and covered Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, and some parts of Russia.71 Under 
the GDL, ethnic Belarussian territory was shaped; settlement patterns and the development 
of trade and economic relations enhanced a common domestic market, social structure, and 
economy of the state.72 Political and economic factors influenced ethno-cultural 
developments of different regions of the GDL with the common cultural traditions.73 The 
Belarusian ethnicity started to form.74 
 Multilingualism in the GDL led to the emergence of the Belarusian language as a 
variety of the Indo-European language family.75 In the 13th–14th centuries, the Belarusian 
language was used to sign such important documents as the treaties of Polotsk, Vitebsk, 
and Smolensk.76 In the 14–17th centuries, Belarusian became an official state language of 
the GDL (the Statute of 1588 legalized the role of the Belarusian language).77 However, 
growing influence of Poles in the GDL affected the usage of the Belarusian language, and 
it was diminished and gradually replaced by Polish. In 1696, the Polish language became 
the official state language of the GDL.78 This development can be considered as the first 
attempt to Westernize Belarusians. 
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The GDL’s involvement in a number of wars in the 16th and 17th centuries, which 
led to enormous human and material losses, and growing dominance of the Polish elite 
within the state, slowed the development of Belarusian identity.79 On July 1, 1569, in 
Lublin, Poland, the Union of Lublin was signed and the single state of Poland and Lithuania 
was created: Rech Pospolitaia (Речь Посполитая), or the Polish–Lithuanian 
Commonwealth.80 This union with Poland gave Poles a leading role in the state’s affairs, 
and infiltration of Polish culture into the GDL’s society degraded dynamic development of 
Belarusian identity.  
One of the major effects of the GDL’s union with Poland was rapid integration of 
Catholicism into the religious sphere of the state’s inhabitants. The power of the Orthodox 
Church started to weaken as early as the late 14th century, when the Union of Krewo was 
signed in 1385, starting the long-lasting shared history and bilateral relations between 
Poland and Lithuania.81 The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth’s pro-Polish government 
promoted Catholicism over Orthodox Christianity, which further deepened ethno-sectarian 
and social conflicts within the state’s population.82  
In the attempt to unify the multi-religious society the Polish–Lithuanian 
Commonwealth’s government promoted the idea of a united Catholic-Orthodox church, 
and in 1596 Brest’s Church Council established the first Uniate Church.83 While this new 
church promoted Catholic dogmas and Orthodox worships, in practice it meant the 
abolition of the Orthodox Church.84 The wave of protests by the Orthodoxy clergy and 
believers forced the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth’s government to officially 
recognize the Orthodox Church.85 The five-hundred-year old Orthodoxy was preserved in 
the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth’s territory; however, Catholicism has contributed 
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immensely to the evolving Belarusian identity and culture.86 Belarusians desire to 
accommodate both the East’s and the West’s values can be traced down to this example of 
the attempt to create the Uniate Church. 
The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth continued to lose its power during the 17th 
and 18th centuries due to unceasing conflicts and wars both domestically and 
internationally. The Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky led a major Cossack revolt in 1648, 
which ended the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth’s eastward expansion, stimulated 
Russia’s expansion to the West, and triggered a series of wars.87 On the other hand, in a 
context of political, economic, social, cultural, and religious developments, Khmelnitsky’s 
uprising set off the long-lasting interaction between the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth 
and Russia and greatly influenced Belarusian identity development.88  
The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth’s multiple armed conflicts in the 17th–18th 
centuries with the Ottoman Empire, Muscovite Rus, Sweden, and Crimean Tatars had 
catastrophic implications for the state: the population decreased almost twice in size from 
2.9 million to 1.4 million people and its economic and political systems were distressed.89 
As a result, civil war broke out, which weakened the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth 
even further.90 The Great Northern War of 1700–1721 took place largely on the territory 
of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and resulted not only in devastating losses of 
human lives but also in loss of political influence in Europe and strong dominance of Russia 
over the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth’s territory.91 
In 1795, after multiple unsuccessful attempts to restore the Polish–Lithuanian 
Commonwealth’s power and international influence, the state was officially dissolved.92 
After another war with Russia and several domestic revolts, in October 1795 the final 
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division took place: almost the entire territory of modern Belarus, a large part of Lithuania, 
and the Duchy of Courland (Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth’s vassal state in the Baltic 
region) were lost to Russia; a small part of Belarus (west of Grodno), part of Polish 
territory, and the western part of Lithuania were lost to Prussia.93 The once mighty Polish–
Lithuanian Commonwealth ceased to exist. 
The incorporation of Belarus’s lands into the Russian Empire marked a historic 
turning point in the fate of Belarusians. Catherine the Great’s vision was full integration of 
Belarus’s lands into the Russian Empire.94 Belarus’s inclusion into Russia had positive 
effect, promoting the economic, political, social, and cultural development of 
Belarusians.95 The agricultural market, Belarus’s main economic sector, expanded 
significantly, with Russians being additional consumers.96 Catherine II had significantly 
strengthened monarchical power, increased the nobility’s privileges, and weakened the 
power of the church through secularization of the convent lands.97 Russia’s policy 
regarding religion was vectored on undermining the Catholic Church and promoting 
Orthodoxy.98 Belarus was turning to the East.  
However, the Patriotic War of 1812 was not only another enormous disaster for the 
Belarusian people, but brought another wave of Belarus’s Westernization. When Napoleon 
invaded Russia on 12 June 1812 (the Patriotic War of 1812), Belarus’s land became a 
battleground.99 By July 1812, almost all of Belarus’s territory was occupied by the French 
army and its allies.100 Napoleon’s promise to restore the Grand Duchy of Lithuania led 
Belarus’s nobility to support Napoleon and even to join the French army.101 Local 
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governments, along with the occupier’s authorities, were supplying the French army with 
food and, as a result, impoverishing Belarus’s peasant households.102 In addition, peasants’ 
initial expectations that Napoleon would bring abolition of serfdom, as he did earlier in 
Poland, were dashed, and peasants ran into the woods and started the guerrilla war against 
French army.103 Napoleon’s final defeat, which started a retreat from Moscow in October 
1812, was completed on Belarus’s land.104 Overall, Belarus lost one million people on the 
battlefields and due to starvation and epidemics.105 Vitebsk, Polotsk, Grodno, Minsk, and 
many other towns were looted and burned.106 Livestock and sown lands were reduced by 
50 percent.107  
The effect of Westernization that the Patriotic War of 1812 had on Belarus can be 
traced through an increase in the gentry’s activity with the main goal to restore the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania, to eliminate feudal practices, and to democratize the society.108 Driven 
by ideas of the Polish national liberation movement and Russia’s Decembrists, Belarus’s 
students started to create clandestine organizations.109 The main notions of these secret 
societies were the abolition of serfdom, constitutional forms of government, and 
developing a middle class from the nobility.110 Following the Warsaw uprising in 1830, 
Belarus’s revolutionaries took up arms in the beginning of 1831, but the rebellion, led by 
nobles without support from peasants, was suppressed first in Belarus, and then in 
Poland.111  
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The 1830–1831 uprising showed the Russian government how significant the 
Polish influence was in Belarus.112 Russian Tsar Nicholas I took a number of steps to 
strengthen Russian power in the region.113 Nobles, involved in the uprising, were deported 
to Siberia with their estates confiscated, more than ten thousand noble families lost their 
titles, and peasants from Russia were relocated to Belarus to further promote 
Russification.114 The church was affected by the Tsar’s repressions: in 1832, of 304 
existing Catholic monasteries, 191 were closed, and sermons in churches were censored.115 
State administration seats were filled by Russian officials, all official documentation had 
to be conducted in the Russian language, and courses in the Polish language were 
banned.116 Thus, between the East and the West, powerful and devastating repressions from 
the East triumphed over Western inspirations.  
Russia’s politics towards Belarus saw some liberalization at the beginning of the 
reign of Alexander II (1855-1881), which nourished pro-Polish aspirations.117 Amnesty 
was granted to all sentenced for political crimes in 1830–1831.118 Belarusian-born citizens 
were allowed to hold civilian posts, the Polish language was allowed in schools, and the 
building of new Catholic churches was granted.119 A widely popular was the project of the 
Lithuanian gentry to petition the Russian Tsar for the annexation of Lithuania and Belarus 
to Poland.120 Belarusian society started to radicalize, and the Russian government began 
losing control over its western territories.121 
Another factor that fueled revolutionary feelings within Belarusian society was the 
fact that the Industrial Revolution, which transformed chiefly agrarian, rural societies in 
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Europe and America into industrial, urban, and democratic, had been slow within the 
Russian Empire. Economic development has lagged due to traditional feudal relationships, 
serfdom, the overexploitation of the peasantry, and Belarus society’s cultural inferiority.122 
To avoid a looming crisis, the Russian government undertook a series of peasantry reforms 
in Belarus that eased peasants’ living conditions and emancipated a large number of 
peasants from serfdom.123 On 19 February 1861, Russian Tsar Alexander II signed the 
Emancipation Manifesto, declaring the abolishment of serfdom in the Russian Empire.124 
While the Emancipation Manifesto made peasants free men who were now allowed to own 
property, to sue in court, and even to participate in local elections, peasants still were 
attached to the land.125  
In 1863, Belarus underwent another major uprising. Similar to the 1830–1831 
revolt, the national liberation uprising in Warsaw in January 1863 motivated Belarus’s 
counterparts to start their own rebellion.126 Led by Vykenty Konstantin Kalinovsky, a 
member of the extreme left wing and an organizer of the first Belarusian-language 
newspaper Peasant’s Truth, rebel groups were formed from nobles, students, artisans, and 
peasants.127 Advocating the social and national liberation of the Belarusian people, 
Kalinovsky’s motto “the people are not for the government, but the government is for the 
people” became the revolutionaries’ principal objective.128 The revolutionaries’ demands 
included the overthrow of autocracy, the establishment of the authority of the people, 
liquidation of the landowners as a class, the transfer of land and all means of production to 
the people, and the creation of the new social order based on a reformed peasants’ 
community.129  
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Again, the uprising was suppressed by the Russian Empire and, similar to the 
outcome in 1830–1831, repressions were taken by the Russian government to tighten its 
power and influence in the region.130 Kalinovsky was arrested and publicly executed by 
hanging in March 1864.131 On the other hand, Russia was seeking to create a positive image 
for itself as the savior of Belarusians from foreign oppressors and carried out a number of 
activities to ease living conditions for Belarusians and to promote the Russian gentry.132  
After 1870s, revolutionary movements in Belarus were developing in parallel to the 
ones in Russia. In 1870–1880s there were the Populists—Herzen and Chernyshevsky’s 
idea of the peasants’ socialism.133 In the 1890s, Marxist ideas started to dominate among 
Belarus’s revolutionaries.134 In March 1898, in Minsk an all-Russian revolutionary 
socialist political party was founded: Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, also known 
as the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party or the Russian Social Democratic 
Party.135 In 1903 the Belarusian Socialist Assembly, BSA (Belarusian: Беларуская 
сацыялістычная грамада, Belarusian Socialist Hramada, BSH) was founded.136 
In the 20th century, Belarus’s history was closely intertwined with that of the 
Russian Empire. The Russo-Japanese war 1904–1905 sharpened social discord in the 
Russian Empire, including in Belarus.137 The increasing working class movement was 
becoming more and more politicized and Lenin’s Bolsheviks’ influence was significant.138 
Bloody Sunday of 9 January 1905, a massacre of peaceful demonstrators in St. Petersburg, 
which started the first Russian Revolution of 1905, provoked a wave of strikes, 
demonstrations, and protests in Belarus.139 However, unlike in Russia, revolutionaries’ 
                                                 
130 Brigadin, Istoria Belorusii v Kontexte Evropeiskoj Istorii. Kurs Lekzij, 149. 
131 Chigrinov, Istoria Belorusii. Uchebnoe Posobie v Pomosch’ Abiturientam, 197. 
132 Chigrinov, 197. 
133 Brigadin, Istoria Belorusii v Kontexte Evropeiskoj Istorii. Kurs Lekzij, 148. 
134 Brigadin, 149. 
135 Brigadin, 149. 
136 Brigadin, 169. 
137 Chigrinov, Istoria Belorusii. Uchebnoe Posobie v Pomosch’ Abiturientam, 243. 
138 Chigrinov, 243. 
139 Brigadin, Istoria Belorusii v Kontexte Evropeiskoj Istorii. Kurs Lekzij, 171. 
27 
activities in Belarus did not grow into armed rebellion.140 Local government acted 
proactively and constructively, making a number of arrests, introducing a state of 
emergency, and redeploying armed forces into the most troubled regions.141  
Russian Tsar Nicholas II’s October Manifesto from 17 October 1905, which 
promised basic civil liberties and creation of a Duma (a legislative body with popularly 
elected members, without whose approval no laws were to be enacted), weakened the 
revolutionary movement in Russia, and had a similar effect in Belarus.142 Belarus’s first 
and second Dumas had little political success, and, with the revolution’s end in December 
1907 in Russia, Belarus’s revolutionary movement became feeble.143  
By the beginning of the World War I (WWI) Belarus’s post-revolutionary period 
of political repression, arrests, retaliatory expeditions, and searches had given way to 
another rise of worker and peasant movements.144 But massive strikes and protests were 
interrupted by WWI, which brought another devastating “hurricane” to Belarus’s lands.145 
The battle line in the Belarus’s territory was along the cities of Dvinsk, Postava, 
Baranovichi, and Pinsk; the western part of Belarus with about 2 million citizens, was 
occupied by the Germans, and the Russian army deployed about 1.5 million soldiers in the 
eastern part of Belarus.146 In the course of WWI, Belarus lost part of its territory.147 
Agriculture had fallen into ruin, factories had to be evacuated from the occupied territories, 
and about 1.5 million citizens fled from Belarus.148 The collapse of the economy led to 
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inflation, speculation, a real threat of famine, and social unrest.149 As a result, widespread 
protests against the government broke out all over the Russian Empire. 
The February Revolution of 1917 in Russian Empire gave a boost to political 
activities in Belarus. Local Belarusian authorities recognized the Russian Provisional 
Government and the Council of Worker’s and Soldier’s Deputies that had been 
proclaimed.150 The October Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd brought Lenin and his 
Bolshevik’s Communist Party to power in Russia. In Belarus, the confrontation between 
Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and other representatives from both the left and right wings 
continued throughout 1917–1918. On 25 March 1918, Belarus declared its independence 
and creation of the Belarus People’s Republic within its ethnic borders; however, this 
decision was not recognized by either the international community or Russia.151 The end 
result of this political turmoil was the Manifesto of Creation of the independent Belarusian 
Soviet Social Republic (BSSR) on 1 January 1919.152  
Belarusian nationalists’ attempts to endorse independence of the BSSR from Russia 
failed. The ruling elite in Minsk was under direct pressure from Moscow and Soviets had 
no interest in given Belarus independence. On a contrary, Soviets perceived Belarus as a 
buffer in the process of spreading socialist revolution globally due to Belarus’s 
geographical location between Russia and the West. Moreover, during the Polish-Soviet 
war of 1919–1921, Belarus territory became a battleground for two foes. In March 1921, 
the Soviet Russia and Poland signed The Treaty of Riga, which ended the Polish–Soviet 
War. After the war, a big part of the Red Army remained on Belarus’s territory, manifesting 
Soviets’ dominance in the BSSR. The Treaty of Riga also divided Belarus between Poland 
and Soviet Russia: the Western part of Belarus became a part of Poland and got the 
unofficial name of Western Belarus.153 As residents of Poland, Western Belarusians had 
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been subject to discrimination and forced polonization.154 Only after the Red Army invaded 
Poland in September 1939, in accord with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’s secret protocol, 
was Western Belarus returned to the BSSR.155 The Soviets’ military presence and political 
dominance in Belarus made the Belarusian elite to support Moscow and, in turn, to lose its 
brief independence.  
B. BELARUS UNDER THE USSR 
After the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in December 
1922, Belarus naturally became a part of the union under Soviet rule.156 The Soviet 
government faced the huge challenge of rebuilding this multinational country with a ruined 
economy after a devastating period of war and revolutions.157 The state adopted the New 
Economic Policy (NEP).158 NEP was a mixture of a free market and a state-controlled 
economy; agriculture and petty commerce belonged to the former, and heavy industry and 
credit to the latter.159 The new Statute of the BSSR State Planning Committee, headed by 
a chairman, was implemented in April 1922.160 The goal of the BSSR Planning Committee 
included “analysis of state economic bodies’ plans, formation of BSSR’s economic plan 
and its coordination with the USSR economic plan, fulfillment of the BSSR’s economic 
plan, and the development of electrification, regionalization, national resources plans, and 
scientific support for the economic plan.”161 
Belarus’s peasants and workers took advantage of this new system, in 1923, 
Belarus’s commercial establishments belonged to private capital, and there were 3,212 
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private companies.162 However, NEP was viewed by the Communist leaders as a capitalist 
system and an obstruction to the road of socialism, and, under Stalin, NEP was 
abandoned.163 Instead, Stalin presented two new pillars of the USSR’s economy: the Five-
Year Plan and collectivization, which were introduced to all of the Soviet republics at the 
end of 1920s and the beginning the 1930s.164 
Under the Five-Year Plan economy, Belarus experienced accelerated 
industrialization.165 Stalin moved exclusively to a centralized command planning economy 
and introduced Gosplan (the central economic plan). Gosplan was an institution, which had 
numerous branch departments (for coal, ferrous metals, machine building, and the like) and 
various summary departments (the departments of finance and costs, the department for 
the annual national economic plan, and the department of capital investment.)166 All 15 
Soviet republics, to include Belarus, had branches of Gosplan.167 In Belarus, automotive, 
tractor, machine-building, radio and electronic, oil-producing, petroleum refining, and 
petrochemical industries were established.168 Automatic production lines, computers, low-
voltage equipment, potassium fertilizers, and wood-based composites, such as particle 
board and fiberboard, were also introduced.169 Big cities such as Minsk, Vitebsk, Mogilev, 
etc., became large industrial centers.170 
Collectivization in Belarus, as in the rest of the USSR, met with strong peasant 
opposition, but created a large agricultural industry; within a decade, 87.5 percent of 
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Belarus’s peasant farms were collectivized.171 Collectivization was Stalin’s policy of the 
forced transformation of private peasant households into collective farm systems called 
“kolkhozes”; peasants had to bring everything they own to the kolkhoz: machinery, tools, 
equipment, animals, etc.172 The Soviet government had to use economic and non-economic 
means to force collectivization. Economically, tax allowances and money credits for 
kolkhozs were established.173 Non-economic practices included a campaign against the 
kulaks (in theory, wealthy peasants, but in practice, peasants who had anything worthwhile 
in their own possession), repression (during collectivization about 600–700 thousand of 
peasants were deported), and administrative punishments for peasant-smallholders.174  
To recognize national self-determination within its vast new borders and multi-
national population, the Soviet Union adopted a federal structure, which meant that the 
republics were to have nominal ethnic autonomy and the official native languages.175 
Soviet Russia and Soviet Belarus signed bilateral agreements covering the most important 
political and economic issues.176 During the 1920s to 1930s, the Belarusian government 
pursued a nation-building policy.177 In practice, it meant the development of Belarusian 
culture, the use of Belarusian language in official documents, and the nomination of 
Belarusians into government and social organizations.178 However, in late 1920s, national 
policy changed radically: the USSR’s campaign against national democrats brought 
repressions against Belarus’s intelligents.179 Almost all members of Belarus’s national 
movement, most members of the Writers’ Union, and members of the Academy of Sciences 
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were labeled as enemies of the people and sentenced, deported, or killed.180 A totalitarian 
regime was established in the USSR.  
World War II devastated Belarus, which experienced immense human losses and 
fierce and prolonged fighting. Nazi Germany occupied the land at the very beginning of 
the war and retained Belarusian territory until 1944.181 Belarusian lands yet again became 
a battleground, this time between Germans and the Soviet Union.182 The Nazis introduced 
a “new order” in Belarus, whose goal was to destroy Soviet rule and to pillage its natural 
resources and national wealth.183 In accordance with the Generalpan “Ost” (Hitler’s plan 
for large-scale genocide, ethnic cleansing, and colonization of Central and Eastern Europe 
by Germany), only 25 percent of Belarusians were to be left on Belarus’s territory as a 
labor force, the other 75 percent were to be killed or deported.184 In practice, the new order 
meant the local population’s genocide, violence, terror, and looting.185 About one million 
people were killed in 260 death camps, built on Belarus’s territory.186 
As Timothy Snyder asserts in his book Bloodlands, “Minsk was a centerpiece of 
Nazi destructiveness.”187 Germans bombed Minsk to the ground before occupying the city 
and then transferred it into the assembly of ghettos, concentration camps, prisoner-of-war 
camps, and killing sites.188 Moreover, the Nazi Holocaust in Minsk was horrifyingly unique 
in the way the Germans mocked, tortured, and murdered Jews.189 
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Belarus was famous for its partisan warfare, which started from the first days of the 
war and became a nightmare for Germans.190 Massive in its nature, partisan warfare 
counted about 1,255 squads, more than 370 thousand soldiers, and about 70 thousand 
underground activists.191 The partisans’ actions, while they were effective militarily, also 
subsequently caused deaths among the civilian population.192 Hitler, in the name of 
counteractions against partisans, offered no legal responsibilities for his soldiers’ behavior 
toward the civilian population, and the horrifying manner, with which Nazis dealt with 
Belarusian civilians, was comparable to the way they dealt with the Jews.193  
The end of WWII brought shattered Belarus back under Soviet rule. On 3 July 1944, 
during the operation “Bagration,” the Soviet Army liberated Minsk, and Belarus was freed 
from German occupation.194 In Belarus, WWII destroyed 209 cities and towns, 9,200 
villages, about ten thousand industrial facilities.195 About half of the Belarusian population 
was either killed or deported.196 The republic lost about half of its national wealth.197 On 
the other hand, Belarusians’ devastating losses and sacrifices during the WWII were 
recognized by the West and gave Belarus a chance to be seen and heard on international 
arena. Belarus became a founding member of the United Nations in 1945; in 1954, Belarus 
joined the International Labour Organization; and, in 1957, it joined the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.198 
Belarus’s economic, political, and social recovery after the war took place in the 
new bipolar world with two major nuclear superpowers: the United States and the USSR. 
Being a part of the latter, Belarus’s economic reconstruction was fortified by Moscow’s 
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financial aid, German reparations, and equipment, commodities, and livestock 
procurements.199 The atmosphere in Belarus was highly patriotic; people were working 
both in cities and in kolkhozes with enthusiasm; liberal attitudes and hopes for relaxation 
of the pre-war were in the air.200 About 15 million Soviet citizens returned to Belarus; 
many of these Red Army soldiers and repatriates had seen life outside the USSR, and 
brought Western ideas to Belarusian society.201 However, Stalin strengthened ideological 
controls and brought back repressions and punitive policies.202 A totalitarian regime was 
restored in Belarus. 
After Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, the USSR’s leaders eased the totalitarian 
regime, but communist ideology, the planned economy, and repressions (though much 
more relaxed compared to Stalin’s) comprised the country’s life.203 Stalin’s successor 
Nikita Khrushchev (1953-1964) was a true believer that communism, in general, is good, 
and innovations were needed mostly to improve living conditions-- that more food and 
housing would solve all the issues in Soviet society. Khrushchev brought the “thaw”—a 
relaxation of censorship and repressions, destalinization, and some Westernization of the 
country. The “thaw” led to rehabilitation of political prisoners in the USSR, and between 
1956 and 1961 about 60 thousand former detainees in Siberian labor camps returned to 
Belarus.204  
 The “thaw” affected the USSR’s international posture as a whole and Belarus’s 
international position in particular. Khrushchev drafted the Warsaw Pact, which was signed 
by the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia on 14 May 1955 in Warsaw.205 Additionally, Khrushchev implemented 
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important foreign policy changes. First, the possible peaceful coexistence with the West, 
particularly with the United States; second, the possibility of avoiding war; and third, the 
idea that there are different ways for countries to become socialist, which suggested that 
the Soviet example was not mandatory for all.206 Khrushchev also developed the idea that 
nuclear weapons made the Soviets’ and the United States’ coexistence obligatory.207 
Moreover, he thought that superior economic production would inherently make 
communism win over capitalism, which, in turn, meant that war was avoidable.208 
During the “thaw,” Belarus was able to extend its international contacts. The 
Belarusian government, in addition to its membership in the United Nations, the 
International Labour Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, created 
the Belarusian Committee for Peace, the Belarusian International Friendship and Cultural 
Relations Society, and the Committee of Youth Organizations.209 Additionally, Belarus 
joined the international twinning movement.210 Belarus’s increased foreign contacts 
contributed to the shaping of partnerships in research, industry, and culture.211  
Overall, these changes in foreign policy and the loosening of the iron curtain 
affected not only Soviet domestic policies, but also created friction in the cohesion of 
international communism.212 However, Khrushchev’s many economic reforms, mainly in 
agriculture, proved to be ineffective and, coupled with continuous changes in all the 
spheres of the country’s life, frustrated many Communist Party members. In 1964, the 
Politburo removed Khrushchev and replaced him with Leonid Brezhnev.  
Brezhnev’s rule between 1964 and 1982 took place in the heat of the Cold War, but 
brought rational and successful reforms to the economy, which in turn helped to improve 
Belarus’s economic situation. In international arena, Belarus was mostly pursuing the 
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interests of the USSR, but, using the United Nations rostrum, it presented itself as an 
ambassador of different nations’ goals of peaceful coexistence.213 Economically, during 
this period, a number of large industrial enterprises were built in Belarus, including 
refineries, chemical and fertilizer plants, heavy machinery factories, and power generation 
facilities.214 Despite heavy investments from Moscow, the “extensification” of agriculture 
during this period led to shortages in food for the population and commodities for 
industries.215  
The beginning of the 1980s has become known as the period of stagnation, when, 
despite the fact that economic performance declined and a shortage of labor occurred across 
the USSR, including in Belarus, the country leaders were comfortable with the status 
quo.216 Starting in the late Brezhnev years and extending into the administrations of Yuri 
Andropov (1982–1984) and Konstantin Chernenko’s (1984–1985), this period brought no 
significant changes. During this period, Belarus underwent steady but slow development 
in the spheres of industrial production, agriculture, education, and science. By the end of 
1980s, Belarus had established robust a machine-building, radio-electronic, and chemical 
complex with about 1,500 factories.217 
In April 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and Belarus, along with the rest 
of the world, entered a new era of history. Due to political forces unleashed by Gorbachev’s 
new policies and reforms, famously known as glasnost and perestroika, the fifteen 
constituent republics eventually broke away from the center and declared their 
independence. On 27 June 1990, the Supreme Council of the BSSR adopted the Declaration 
of Independence.218 On 19 September 1991, the BSSR’s Supreme Council agreed on 
renaming the BSSR as “the Republic of Belarus”; a Belarusian flag and coat of arms were 
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legislated.219 Finally, in December 1991, the USSR ceased to exist. Independent Belarus’s 
modern history has begun.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Two major points stand out from analyzing the origins and history of Belarus: 1) 
the country’s deep dependence on Russia and 2) Belarus’s desire for peace. Ethnic ties with 
Russia and other Slavic tribes were heavily used in Minsk’s official statements to 
emphasize the deep historical connection with the East. Moreover, Russia’s continued 
governance and control over Belarus’s territory, which started with Catherine the Great’s 
attempt to fully integrate Belarus’s lands into the Russian Empire at the end of the 18th 
century, brought heavy economic and political dependency on Russia for modern Belarus. 
Belarus’s history shaped the country’s main foreign policy objectives: neutrality between 
East and West and peacemaking. Throughout history, Belarus had been a middle ground 
for devastating wars, and Belarus witnessed its population being decimated numerous 
times. Such experiences molded Belarusian’s perspective on the importance of peaceful 
coexistence both domestically and internationally. 
Modern Belarus’s foreign policy and national security inherited the country’s 
unique history. Lukashenko’s attempts to find a balance between the East and the West 
have deep historical roots, which are monitored throughout Belarus’s history. Until 1991, 
Belarus always had external strong and powerful rulers, representing both the East and the 
West. However, the Westernization proved short-lived among Belarusians and the East, 
particularly Russia, had long controlled Belarus’s development. As long as it is not 
economically dangerous for Belarus, Lukashenko supports Western activities. Moreover, 
Belarus’s defense relies heavily on Russian support, and Belarus is not interested in 
changing the status quo in the security sphere. As the next chapter will show, Belarus today 
is trying to straddle between the West and Russia in search of internal economic stability 
and peaceful coexistence with both sides.  
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III. BELARUS AND THE EST 
This chapter examines Belarus’s relationship with the East, particularly with Russia 
as the key actor in the region. Despite a number of disputes largely driven by economic 
concerns, Minsk and Moscow remain political, economic, and security allies, though on a 
more pragmatic basis than before the dissolution of the USSR. This chapter, organized 
thematically, starts with the end of the Cold War and the end of the Warsaw Pact. Next, 
this chapter overviews the creation and functions of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). The chapter then surveys the brief period of Belarus’s Westernization in 
1991–1994. After the first presidential election in Belarus in 1994, the country took a pro-
Russian course and, while it tried to present itself as progressive and pro-Western state, it 
retained strong ties with Russia. Moving forward, this chapter takes a closer look at 
Belarus’s post-USSR political, economic, and security relationship with Russia, including 
the Union State of Belarus and Russia initiative. Separate segment of this chapter is 
dedicated to Belarus’s national security. Finally, Belarus’s involvement with the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is analyzed, as this is a major security organization 
in the East that ties Belarus’s security to Russia.  
A. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE END OF THE WARSAW 
PACT 
After Belarus declared its independence in June 1990, the republic faced unique 
challenges related to the need to reform all aspects of the country’s governance, both 
domestic and international. At home, Belarus’s leaders had to restructure the country’s 
economic and political systems to be independent from Moscow. Internationally, 
establishing Belarus’s foreign policy and addressing security issues were two top priorities 
of the newly elected Belarus government. After a brief Westernization period led by the 
first head of the independent state, Stanislau Shushkevich, Belarus pivoted back to Russia 
under pro-Russian President Aleksandr Lukashenko.  
President Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost gave way to radical 
changes in the USSR’s political and economic systems and democratized society; they also 
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affected the relationships between the Soviet republics and Moscow. The first Congress of 
People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union in May-June 1989 formed a fulltime parliament—
the new Supreme Soviet, and allowed a political opposition group to be formed for the first 
time.220 Still under the control of the center, the republics were allowed to form bilateral 
economic relations between each other and with other countries and to participate in 
international organizations.221 As it moved in contradictory directions, the USSR’s 
economy began to enter into a serious decline, which led to a decline in production and in 
standards of living, as well as the disruption of the provision of food, manufactured goods, 
and services to the population.222  
Meanwhile, Soviet society started to radicalize, with strikes and demonstrations 
were spreading across the country. Belarus was no exception. The first democratic 
elections to the BSSR Supreme Soviet took place on 4 March 1990, and the first session of 
the Belarus’s Supreme Soviet was held in May 1990.223 During this session, a number of 
laws were adopted, including on the transition to a market-based economy, strengthening 
the social protection of the population, and dealing with the consequences of the 1986 
Chernobyl nuclear accident.224 However, Belarus, like the rest of the republics, was still 
largely under Moscow’s control.  
The August 1991 coup in Moscow highlighted the need for a new federal structure 
between the republics and the center and created more favorable conditions for the 
republics to strengthen their independence.225 On 18–21 August in Moscow, the 
Communist system’s old guards attempted to overthrow President Gorbachev.226 The coup 
failed, bringing down the USSR’s old political regime and giving way to new political 
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freedoms.227 After the victory, Boris Yeltsin, the first popularly elected president of 
Russian Federation, his allies, and the Russian Parliament started to shape a new political 
landscape seeded with ideas of freedom and democracy.228 For the Soviet republics, the 
way was open to withdraw from the Soviet Union and become completely independent 
states.229 On 25 August 1991, an extraordinary meeting of the Superior Council of Belarus 
proclaimed the political and economic independence of the BSSR.230  
B. THE CIS 
Building upon the tradition of being the neutral ground for negotiations, Belarus 
hosted the notorious meeting of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian leaders in the elite 
hunting lodge in the west of the country on 7–8 December 1991.231 Despite the fact that 
the meeting took place on its territory, Belarus’s role felt less important than that of the 
other two Slavic republics.232 New to politics and with no meaningful support from 
Belarus’s political elite, Shushkevich represented the smallest country with the weakest 
economy of the three.233 On 8 December 1991, the three Slavic leaders signed an agreement 
creating the CIS, effectively announcing the dissolution of the USSR.234 To formally 
acknowledge that the USSR no longer existed, the preamble of the agreement started with 
the following:  
We, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of 
Ukraine as founder states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR), which signed the 1922 Union treaty, further described as the high 
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contracting parties, conclude that the USSR has ceased to exist as a subject 
of international law and a geopolitical reality.235 
The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus ratified the CIS agreement on 10 
December 1991.236 
 The idea was implemented to replace the USSR with the free union of former 
Soviet republics sharing a common defense and economic space. However, Russian, 
Ukrainian, and Belarusian leaders hoped for fundamentally different outcomes.237 Yeltsin 
saw the CIS as a new form of the old union and used the dissolution of the USSR to dismiss 
his rival, the leader of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev. Leonid Kravchuk, the newly elected 
first president of Ukraine, saw the CIS as a transit vehicle from the USSR to complete 
independence. Belarus’s leader Shushkevich was more aligned with Yeltsin, but 
envisioned Belarus’s leading role in the union and the revival of the country’s national 
identity.238 After receiving the assurance of parity within the new union from the leaders 
of Slavic states, eight more republics joined the CIS; on 21 December 1991, the Alma-Ata 
declaration was signed by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.239  
The CIS’s core framework consisted of the Commonwealth Charter, the Economic 
Union Treaty, and the Collective Security Treaty.240 The political landscape of the CIS 
rested on the Commonwealth Charter. It was debated during the January 1993 CIS summit, 
and signed and ratified by all members of the CIS except Ukraine and Turkmenistan.241 
Belarus’s ratification excluded the collective security article because Minsk was 
dissatisfied with Russia’s leading role.242 The Collective Security Treaty, which was 
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discussed during the 15 May 1992 Tashkent summit, mainly represented Russian defense 
policy and originally was signed only by six members of the CIS.243 The Economic Union 
Treaty, which strengthened economic integration within the CIS, was a reaction of the CIS 
member states to their collapsing economies.244 Under the treaty, the Interstate Economic 
Committee was created with the major function of managing the customs and payments 
unions.245  
The CIS’s practical effectiveness has always been questionable, even among top 
CIS officials, and now it is more a symbol then an active body.246 Russia’s ambitions to 
dominate the CIS and its vision as a default leader of the CIS, and a number of 
disagreements among the CIS members led to very slow implementation of any treaties or 
agreements. In the early 2000s, the CIS’s relevance declined even further. From about 
1,500 signed documents, only ten percent were actually implemented, and the CIS summits 
were losing their importance.247 President Putin’s words in March 2005 in Yerevan 
summarized the common attitude towards the CIS:  
If anyone expected some special achievements from the CIS, for example 
regarding the economy or cooperation in political, military or other spheres, 
this indeed did not happen, nor could it have happened. There were declared 
aims, but in reality the CIS was established so as to make the process of the 
USSR’s dissolution the most civilized and smooth one, with the fewest 
losses in the economic and humanitarian spheres… The CIS has never had 
economic super-tasks, such as economic integration… This is a very useful 
club for mutual information and the clarification of general political, 
humanitarian and administrative problems.248 
Nevertheless, Belarus was an active CIS participant and Minsk played an important 
role in the CIS’s integration processes throughout the period of the formation and 
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development of the union.249 It is not coincidental that the CIS’s headquarters are located 
in Minsk.250 By 2013, Belarus signed and ratified about 90 percent of the CIS’s adopted 
documents.251  
While the CIS still exists, in practice its role is more a symbolic union among the 
former USSR republics. The CIS fulfilled its role as a transit station from the USSR to 
complete independence, but a number of bilateral and multilateral unions have been created 
by the former Soviet republics to foster economic cooperation and promote political and 
security integration.  
C. THE BRIEF PERIOD OF BELARUS’S WESTERNIZATION IN 1991–1994 
The major goal of the CIS was to keep the economic, political, and security domains 
of the former USSR republics together, however, during the 1991–1994 period, 
Belarusians has been able to experience a brief period of Westernization. One of the 
significant implications of the August coup on Belarus was the dismissal from the 
chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet of the career Communist Party apparatchik Nikolai 
Dementrei, and the election of the pro-Western university professor of physics Stanislau 
Shushkevich as the new leader of the country.252 Shushkevich had nationalist views and 
wished for Belarus to have its own identity, independent from Russia. Under 
Shushkevich’s leadership, the independent Republic of Belarus pursued a 
multidimensional foreign policy approach through the development of trade, economic, 
and political relations with international and regional partners and promoting Minsk as the 
world’s peacemaker.253 Shushkevich advocated the concept of a nuclear-free and neutral 
state.254  
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However, being an unexperienced politician with no contacts or allies within the 
old system, Shushkevich had little power, and his attempt to Westernize Belarus was 
limited.255 With the Communist Party losing its position, too, real power drifted to the 
executive branch, and pro-Russian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich, who was promoting 
integration with Moscow, was able to limit Shushkevich’s actions.256 Battling with his pro-
Russian, integrationist counterparts led by Kebich, Shushkevich offered the idea of a “belt 
of neutral states” in April 1993, consisting of Poland, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, and 
possibly the three Baltic states.257 Shushkevich asserted that this arrangement would be a 
“security guarantee for member-states and serve as a model for the world.”258 However, 
his proposal found little support either in Europe or in Belarus.  
Belarus’s leaders understood the importance of economic development and 
implementation of national security, but Shushkevich’s approach to do this independently 
from Russia was counterbalanced by Kebich’s integrationist ambitions. Belarus’s defense 
heavily relied on the CIS agreement. Moreover, even among the CIS member states, the 
debates around the armed forces (both strategic and tactical) were lengthy. The Alma-Ata 
declaration states: “The strategic forces across the CIS must remain unified, but the armed 
forces should be divided.”259 The CIS agreement’s Article 5 guaranteed the territorial 
integrity of each member, and Article 6 stated that participating countries would remain 
under a unified command and control of their military-strategic space.260  
The CIS Tashkent summit of 1992 had important implications for Belarus’s 
security. First, Shushkevich, in his pursuit of an independent Belarus, decided not to sign 
the CIS Collective Security Treaty.261 On 9 April 1993, however, following Kebich’s 
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endorsement of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, Belarus signed the pact.262 Second, all 
CIS members, including Belarus, signed the Tashkent Statement on Armed Forces 
Cutbacks, which was an agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments.263 
Third, Belarus became a party to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE treaty), which was originally signed between members of NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact in Paris on 19 November 1990.264 The CFE treaty’s chief goal was deep cuts in 
weapons holdings; the agreement imposed on Belarus the destruction of 3,127 heavy 
weapons (tanks, armored combat vehicles, and aircraft).265  
In the economic sphere, during 1991–1994, Belarus, despite attempted 
liberalization and reformation, continued to be dependent on Russia. After the collapse of 
the USSR, the Belarusian economy suffered tremendously. The demand for its 
manufactured products fell sharply because its production was focused on specific 
agricultural and industrial products for the Communist bloc market, which was rapidly 
collapsing after 1991.266 Lacking free market experience and educational capacity, the 
country tried to keep its planned economy system in order to maintain traditional 
communist control and discipline.267 To some extent, Belarus adopted price liberalization 
and freed prices from administrative controls to facilitate reforms.268 Unlike other post-
USSR countries, however, Belarus was committed to retaining the ruble as its national 
currency and postponed the introduction of its own currency until late fall 1991 with the 
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hope of continued subsidized energy support from Russia.269 In July 1992, Belarus joined 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).270 The IMF provided loans and technical 
assistance to Belarus to help the country in developing its private sector and also to find 
ways to reduce state subsidies.271 However, the development of a market economy was 
hindered by the inherited communist political system.272 Belarus still relied heavily on 
energy imports from Russia, which supplied 90 percent of Belarus’s oil and gas.273 Russia 
did not hesitate to use this as leverage to gain political and military concessions from the 
near abroad.274 By mid-1993, an economic crisis had engulfed almost all of the CIS 
countries and the only solution was deepening economic integration.275 
Belarus’s government, pursuing an open foreign policy and a liberalizing society, 
seemed to be satisfied with an unreformed economy. The adoption of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Belarus on 30 March 1994 was Shushkevich’s last attempt to make the 
country more independent from Russian influence.276 Article 17 of the constitution made 
the Belarusian language the only official language, listing the Russian language as a 
“language for international communication.”277 Additionally, Belarus’s national symbols 
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were introduced.278 In 1994, the Prime Minister Kebich proclaimed that his government 
had “managed to stem the tide of reformist euphoria. Thanks to this our people were not 
hungry, had their homes heated in winter, produced goods, tilled the soil.”279 However, in 
practice, the average Belarusian citizens’ living conditions were declining, the consumer 
market was in crisis, and citizens were given “consumer’s business cards” for purchasing 
industrial goods and coupons for purchasing food items.280 Belarus’s society was looking 
for changes as public tensions were growing, which directly impacted the first Belarusian 
presidential election on 20 July 1994.  
D. BELARUS’S UNEASY RE-INTEGRATION WITH RUSSIA UNDER 
LUKASHENKO 
Alexander Lukashenko’s ascension to power was another pivotal point in Belarus’s 
history, which moved the country away from the Westernization and democratization. 
Lukashenko’s agenda, which led him to a presidential victory, was anti-imperialist, anti-
corruption, and USSR-nostalgic.281 Despite nationalist opposition, Belarus’s new president 
decided that establishing an economic, political, and military union with Russia was the 
best way for the country to move forward, and Russian-Belarusian integration became 
official state policy. In the mid-1990s, agreements on economics, Customs union, and 
military integration were reached.282 In January 1995, Moscow and Minsk signed the 
Friendship and Cooperation Treaty and a number of bilateral agreements, unifying Belarus 
and Russia in the economic and military spheres.283  
Belarus’s new pro-Russian leader started to pivot the country back to the East and 
away from previously emerging democratization processes. In November 1996, 
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Lukashenko held a referendum that gave him almost unlimited power.284 The constitution 
of Belarus was amended and the president amplified his power at the expense of the 
legislature and judiciary.285 Article 17 was amended and the Russian language became an 
official language on a par with the Belarusian language.286  
The official political and economic re-integration began in 1996, when Yeltsin and 
Lukashenko agreed on the creation of the Union State of Belarus and Russia.287 The 
Agreement on Establishment of the Union State of Belarus and Russia was signed on 8 
December 1999 by the heads of state.288 According to the agreement, Belarus and Russia 
defined a series of major goals, including fostering peaceful and democratic development; 
establishing a single economic and customs area and proper legal framework; pursuing 
cooperative foreign, defense, and social policies; ensuring security; and fighting against 
crime.289 The Union State agreement laid out a legal basis for Belarus’s and Russia’s 
gradual integration.  
The Union State of Belarus and Russia proved to be more effective than the CIS. 
The goal of the organization was to create a common state run by the “High Council” of 
both presidents, prime ministers, and parliamentary speakers, to create a provisional 
customs union, to introduce a common currency (with no specific timeframe), and to unify 
the two countries’ policies.290 In practice, however, convergence of currencies occurred, 
the Customs union existed only until 2001, and no governing integration took place.291 Still 
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more effective than the CIS, the Union proved to be much less productive in terms of the 
economic integration than expected. 
When Putin came to power in 2000, relations between Belarus and Russia became 
more pragmatic. The Russian president, using Minsk’s dependence on Russian oil and gas 
supplies, manipulated Belarus’s economic and political decisions towards his own 
agenda.292 In 2006, the Russia-Belarus energy crisis unfolded, which soured relations 
between Moscow and Minsk further. The renewed energy supply agreement between 
Belarus and Moscow, signed at the last minute on 31 December 2006 under pressure from 
Moscow, prompted a very negative reaction from Belarus’s president.293 The new 
agreement included Gazprom’s $2.5 billion acquisition of 50 percent of Beltransgaz, the 
Belarus pipeline network, a gradual increase of Gazprom’s gas prices for Belarus, and a 
requirement that 70 percent of the refined oil products’ tax revenues be transferred to 
Russia.294 Additionally, Russia imposed a customs fee of $53 per ton for crude oil 
deliveries to Belarus, which were previously duty-free.295  
Lukashenko reacted furiously to this agreement, calling the Russian behavior 
shameless.296 In early January 2007, Belarus stated that Russia had not been paying the 
customs fee for transferring oil through Belarus and began legal action against Russia.297 
This led to the shutdown of the Druzhba pipeline, one of the world’s biggest pipelines that 
delivers crude oil to the European Union and runs through Belarus.298 Russia later said it 
had to cut off supplies through the Druzhba pipeline because Belarus had begun siphoning 
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off oil as tax payment.299 Moscow, in turn, threatened to impose taxes on all Belarusian 
imports.300  
The situation deescalated when Russia promised duty-free supplies of crude oil 
identified for domestic consumption.301 Belarus’s authorities reacted accordingly, when 
Prime Minister Sergei Sidorsky announced: “The government, taking into consideration 
bilateral agreements with the Russian government, has taken the decision . . . to cancel the 
state duty for the transit of oil along the state pipeline network.”302 This supply agreement 
was changed again in January 2010, reassuring the subsidies on oil imports from Russia, 
but cutting the amount by half.303  
The tensions between Moscow and Minsk continued. Putin, in a TV interview in 
October 2012, replied to a question about what he thought about President Lukashenko: 
“Despite our relationship with the Belarusian government--there are sparks between us 
from time to time--, I should say that the Belarusian government is clearly and firmly 
heading towards economic integration with Russia. Such a choice deserves support and 
respect.”304 Clearly, Putin did not show any cordial signs towards Lukashenko, as he did 
not even called Lukashenko by his name. Moreover, the oil and gas conflict resurfaced at 
the beginning of 2016, when Minsk, without any agreement with Moscow, significantly 
cut actual payments for gas to Russia.305 According to Minsk, Belarus deserved lower 
domestic prices on Russian gas due to Belarus’s membership in the Eurasian Economic 
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Union (EEU).306 Russia’s retaliatory decision to decrease the oil supply had a damaging 
impact on Belarus’s economy because of Belarus’s budget dependence on oil re-export 
income.307 Frustrated, Lukashenko did not attend the OSCE summit and skipped the 
Supreme Council of the EEU in Russia, which postponed Belarus’s signature on the EEU’s 
new Customs Code.308 
 In February 2017, Belarus introduced visa-free entrance (for no more than five 
days) for seventy-nine countries (including the United States), causing another negative 
reaction from Moscow.309 Even before the new visa-free policy took effect in Belarus, 
Russian authorities introduced a “full-fledged border-protection regime,” establishing 
Russia-Belarus physical border controls and security zones.310 Moscow defended its 
decision by the rhetoric of the national security protection.311 Russian authorities issued a 
statement underlying their position:  
We would like to emphasize that no border regime has been introduced but 
border zones have been set up in the areas adjacent to the border as it is 
necessary to regulate the visits of other countries’ citizens…. Neither 
Russian nor Belarusian nationals, who are citizens of the Union State, will 
be affected by this measure.312 
Minsk, on the other hand, insisted that establishment of the border controls violates 
the border agreement of the Union State of Belarus and Russia.313  
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Russia’s continuing border controls seem to irritate Belarus’s president, but they 
did not stop him from extending the visa-free entrance policy. During his recent border 
control points visit on 1 June 2018, Lukashenko articulated his attitude towards Russia’s 
border control policy: “If they close [the border], we must also impose border controls,” 
but added that he would not implement any changes and would wait for Moscow’s next 
step.314 Nevertheless, on 27 July 2018, Lukashenko signed another decree allowing citizens 
of seventy-four countries, generally only excluding countries with which Belarus has 
bilateral visa-free agreement, to stay in Belarus visa-free for thirty days.315  
`This prolonged confrontation re-emerged in the dairy sector, which is another 
export-sensitive area of Belarus’s economy, when Russia accused Belarus’s dairy 
producers of violations of health standards.316 Almost mimicking the 2009 two-week ban 
on dairy products imports, on 26 February 2017, Russian food standards institution 
Rosselkhoznadzor prohibited import of many Belarusian dairy products into Russia.317 
Belarus’s dairy farmers, affected by the restrictions in a variety of forms from strict 
monitoring to complete embargo, were forced to extend their dairy export market to other 
countries, including China.318 This move was publicly interpreted by Moscow as Belarus 
taking advantage of the Russian import limitations due to Western sanctions.319 The 
situation started to de-escalate in April 2017, when the two leaders met in St. Petersburg 
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and agreed on energy supply issues.320 In June 2018, the dairy conflict was resolved 
between the two countries, but the question is, for how long?321 
In Lukashenko’s search to balance Belarus’s economic interests, the recent spike 
in Belarus-China relations is worth mentioning. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
triggered its interest in Belarus.322 Located between Asia and Europe, Belarus naturally 
became an important part of the BRI’s transportation system.323 Not prepared for the 
proposed increases in traffic, Belarus’s transportation infrastructure required investments. 
China readily stepped forward.324 China has invested into the manufacturing sector as well. 
Two major recipients are the Midea Group, a microwave oven and water heater 
manufacturer, and the Great Stone Industrial Park.325 Such collaboration between Belarus 
and China not only stimulates Belarus’s economic development, but also diversifies 
Minsk’s efforts in the Eastern direction.  
E. BELARUS’S NATIONAL SECURITY 
Despite continuous confrontations between Minsk and Moscow, Belarus relies 
heavily on the Russian-Belarusian bilateral military alliance.326 Belarus provides military 
support to Russia in different aspects of its defense activities. One of the most important is 
Russia’s large “Zapad” (West) military exercise, which takes place every four years and 
was held jointly with Belarus in 2009, 2013, and 2017.327 In addition to joint military 
exercises, two Russian military facilities are operating in Belarus: a radar station at 
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Gantsevichi and a naval communications center in Vileyka.328 Both facilities have official 
military base status and Belarus does not charge fees for the lease of the facilities. Notably, 
this agreement expires in 2020, and it is unclear if Belarus will renew it on the same 
terms.329  
Belarus’s heavy reliance on Russian support for national security is clearly evident 
in Belarus’s National Security Concept. The National Security Concept was adopted on 27 
March 1995 as the first conceptual document that laid out the national security framework 
of independent Belarus.330 In general, the document outlines the means and methods of 
defense of the individual’s, society’s, and country’s vital interests.331 Particularly, the 
concept points to the need for promoting cooperation with the Russian Federation within 
the Union State of Belarus and Russia’s framework practically in all spheres.332  
While Belarus’s national security relies on support from Russia, Lukashenko still 
tries to straddle between Moscow and the West. Belarus’s reaction to Russia’s intervention 
in Ukraine in 2014 and subsequent annexation of Crimea was two-sided. On the one hand, 
Lukashenko “did not like it,” as he said during a speech on 22 April 2014 at the Belarus 
Parliament and did not officially recognize the annexation.333 On the other hand, during 
several interviews and speeches later on, Belarus’s president asserted that Crimea is de 
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facto Russian territory and even partly blamed Ukraine for the crisis.334 Additionally, 
Lukashenko’s regime, in pursue of its agenda as the world’s peacemaker, offered Minsk as 
a site for Russian-Ukrainian negotiations.335 Such independent behavior, which led to 
Western warmth towards Minsk, made Russian-Belarusian relations even less friendly.336  
F. BELARUS’S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
TREATY ORGANIZATION (CSTO) 
In 1992, Belarus joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).337 
The CSTO is a purely military alliance and all six of this military alliance’s members are 
former Soviet Union republics: Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan.338 The CSTO originated from the Collective Security Treaty (Tashkent 
treaty).339 In 2002, the CSTO was restructured as a military alliance.340 While the 
fundamental objective of the organization lies in the military and military-technical 
spheres, CSTO members also address environmental security, the drug trade, human 
trafficking, and organized crime.341  
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President Lukashenko has criticized the CSTO on several occasions and, at some 
points, even threatened to cease funding its activities.342 Lukashenko complained when the 
CSTO failed to support the Kyrgyz government during its civil unrest in spring 2015.343 In 
May 2004, during a meeting between Lukashenko and General Secretary of the CSTO 
Nikolai Bordyuzha, the Belarusian president proposed direct CSTO-NATO consultations, 
an idea that was never implemented.344 This step was in response to Lukashenko’s early-
2000s perception of growing support of NATO among the CIS states, including Russia.345 
In June 2009, Lukashenko boycotted the annual CSTO summit in Moscow.346 His 
explanation for this was Moscow’s economic pressures against Belarus and conflict over 
oil and gas.347 The Belarusian foreign ministry stated that 
there is an overt economic discrimination by a CSTO member country 
against Belarus. Such actions undermine economic security, which is a 
foundation for stability and a pillar of comprehensive security… [Belarus’ 
participation in the summit] would mock common sense against the 
backdrop of trade wars waged by some CSTO members against others. In 
this situation, Belarus has no choice but to cancel its participation in the 
CSTO summit in Moscow. Belarus will sign the package of documents on 
the rapid reaction force only when comprehensive security will have been 
restored within the CSTO.348 
Nevertheless, Lukashenko’s more recent statements suggest his continuing support 
to the organization, with a grain of salt. In November 2017, Belarus held a session of the 
Collective Security Council of the CSTO, where Lukashenko welcomed all of the CSTO’s 
heads of states. During his opening speech, President Lukashenko said, “Belarus is a 
consistent supporter of vigorous cooperation within the framework of the CSTO, a 
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supporter of the more productive operation of the organization, and a backer of stronger 
authority of the organization on the international scene.”349 Belarus’s president showed 
some positive emotions during the session, saying, “There are no countries closer and 
dearer to each other [than the members of the CSTO] in the whole world.”350 During his 
February 2018 Belarusian Security Council meeting speech, Lukashenko criticized Russia 
for its lack of support in the effort to modernize and arm the CSTO members’ militaries: 
“Russia is modernizing its armed forces by itself. Other members [of the CSTO] are trying 
to arm, modernize, and so on. But only by themselves.”351 
G. CONCLUSION 
For Belarus, Russia is its number one trade partner, its chief oil and gas supplier, 
an ethnic Slavic brother, and its main geopolitical neighbor. The two countries are 
historically intertwined in all spheres of life, both politically and culturally. The ties 
between Minsk and Moscow remain strong and, while they cannot prevent future conflicts, 
they preserve Russia’s involvement into Belarus’s affairs, including foreign policy and 
security concerns. But relations between Lukashenko and Putin remain strained especially 
in the political and economic spheres, yet their strong military alliance is the main bulwark 
of Belarus’s security and continues to exist through joint major military exercises and 
Russia’s military presence on Belarus’s territory. The CSTO’s efforts are led by Russia.  
Lukashenko’s Soviet inheritance and Belarus’s Russia-dependent economic legacy 
have strongly influenced Minsk’s domestic and international policies. Domestically, 
Lukashenko is reluctant to liberalize the economy and to Westernize its society. At the 
same time, the Belarusian president does not support strong nationalist movements within 
the country and is trying to keep Belarusians pro-Slavic– and pro-Russian–minded. The 
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brotherhood with Russia is accentuated on 2 April, when Belarusians celebrate the Day of 
Unity of Peoples of Russia and Belarus (the day when the first Commonwealth agreement 
between Russia and Belarus was signed).352 The leadership even tries to keep Soviet 
traditions alive. Major Soviet holidays are still celebrated in Belarus, including: the 
October Revolution on 7 November, Fatherland Defenders and Armed Forces day on 23 
February, Victory Day on 9 May, Labor Day on 1 May, and Women’s Day on 8 March.353  
Internationally, Belarus actively pursues the agenda of a neutral and peaceful state, 
carefully counterbalancing Moscow’s ambitions with calculated responses from Minsk. 
Nevertheless, the Belarusian president is constantly searching for the most beneficial 
compromise for Belarus between the West and the East. Belarus’s recent interest in 
Chinese investment, which was briefly reviewed in this chapter, helps to counterbalance 
Minsk’s sympathy with the West, but also provides it with relief from Moscow’s economic 
pressure tactics. In the next chapter, Belarus’s relations with Western organizations will be 
reviewed, paying specific attention to NATO, the OSCE, and the EU, as these three 
institutions are critical for the security and stability of this region located between East and 
West.  
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IV. BELARUS AND THE WEST 
As emphasized in the previous chapter, Belarus pursues a foreign policy of 
neutrality and peacemaking, balancing the country’s interests between Russia and the 
West. Belarus is involved in a number of regional and international organizations, but, in 
this chapter, only the OSCE, NATO, and the EU will be examined, as they play critical 
roles in European security. Starting with a brief overview of the OSCE’s historical role in 
the region’s security during the Cold War, the chapter examines Belarus’s fluctuating 
interest in the OSCE. Next, the chapter surveys Belarus’s evolving interaction with NATO, 
including the development of cooperation between Belarus and the United States. Finally, 
this chapter examines Belarus’s relationship with the EU, which has been complex since 
the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992.354  
Minsk’s strong belief in the importance of Belarus’s neutrality in the international 
arena and its role as a peacemaker are reflected in the country’s foreign policy and, along 
with strong ties with Russia, affects its relations with the OSCE, NATO, and the EU. With 
all three organizations, Belarus is interested in cooperation in the economic and security 
arenas, but, at the same time, reserves its rights to develop its country in its own unique 
way without Western intrusions. Lukashenko continues to resist attempts from the West to 
democratize Belarusian politics and society and to reform the country’s economy, but, 
simultaneously, he has supported initiatives to develop cooperation with the OSCE, 
NATO, and the EU.  
A. BELARUS AND THE OSCE 
The OSCE’s inclusive membership rules allowed Belarus to become a full-fledged 
member in January 1992, but Minsk’s degree of involvement and interest in the 
organization has fluctuated under Lukashenko’s rule.355 Moreover, the Belarusian 
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government’s attitudes and reactions are also carefully crafted to avoid drawing 
disapproval from Moscow. Belarus acknowledges the important role the OSCE plays in 
regional security and maintains relations with the organization, but Belarusian officials do 
not hesitate to criticize some of the OSCE’s actions. 
A brief overview of the OSCE is necessary to clarify the organization’s important 
role in the European security setting. The OSCE is the largest regional security 
organization in the world, with fifty-seven participating states, including Belarus.356 
Started as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1973, the 
meeting was a reaction to the developments of the Cold War.357 The chief purpose of the 
CSCE was to promote security and peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, given the atmosphere 
of confrontation between the United States and the USSR.358 Following two-year-long 
negotiations among the European countries, the USSR, and the United States, known as 
the Helsinki Process, in 1975 the Helsinki Final Act initiated the CSCE.359 The end of the 
Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union transformed the conference into an 
organization, and the CSCE was renamed the OSCE in December 1994 during the 
Budapest Summit of Heads of State.360  
As the European security landscape changed dramatically in the post-Cold War era, 
the OSCE’s agenda altered as well. As the organization’s website announces: “the OSCE 
addresses issues that have an impact on our common security, including arms control, 
terrorism, good governance, energy security, human trafficking, democratization, media 
freedom and national minorities.”361 With NATO and EU enlargements, the OSCE’s 
relevance in providing stability in the region has diminished, but with the Russian 
Federation and the United States as two key actors, it is still perceived by OSCE member 
                                                 
356 “Who we are,” OSCE, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.osce.org/who-we-are.  
357 David J. Galbreath, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 1st ed. 
(Routledge, 2007), 1.  
358 Galbreath, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 1.  
359 Galbreath, 9.  
360 “History,” OSCE, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.osce.org/history.  
361 OSCE, “Who we are.” 
63 
states as a respected forum and security organization with many field offices around the 
region.362 
OSCE membership requires a number of commitments, and these commitments are 
not always met by Belarus. Some of the country’s commitments to the OSCE, like the 
reduction of conventional weapons under the CFE treaty, destruction of man-portable air-
defense systems (MANPDS), or efforts in non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, Belarus was unable to meet due to a lack of resources, knowledge, and 
experience, and assistance from the international community was necessary.363 However, 
some OSCE obligations, especially in the realms of democratization and human rights, 
were often ignored by Minsk. Belarus’s failure to meet the OSCE’s requirements feeds 
tensions between Minsk and the organization.  
The positive relations between Minsk and the OSCE show themselves mainly in 
the area of arms control. Belarus, left with a large surplus of arms after the dissolution of 
the USSR, requested OSCE assistance in fulfilling its CFE Treaty obligations to destroy a 
large amount of weapons (discussed in Chapter III).364 The OSCE’s Forum for Security 
Cooperation (FSC), established in 1992, was responsible for arms destruction support and 
established assistance projects in 1996.365 In 2003, under the OSCE’s Small Arms and 
Light Weapons stockpile security and management project, Belarus started to destroy its 
MANPADS surplus.366 In June 2018, a multi-year highly toxic fuel components removal 
project, led by the OSCE, was completed, leaving Belarus free from these hazardous 
chemicals.367 According to a U.S. Department of State report from 2018, Belarus is in 
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compliance with the country’s CFE Treaty obligations, in large part because of the OSCE 
assistance.368  
Belarus’s commitment to being a nuclear-weapon-free, neutral state is supported 
by the OSCE through the OSCE’s involvement in the UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1540 implementation.369 The resolution, aimed at prohibition of the proliferation 
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and means of delivery of weapons of mass 
destruction, was adopted by participating states in 2004.370 Given the complexity of 
UNSCR 1540, international experience and joint activities are essential components for 
successful implementation of the resolution.371 Belarus used the FSC as an international 
platform for developing its own action plan and strategy.372  
The tensions between Minsk and the OSCE are prominent in the sphere of human 
rights and freedoms. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(OSCE/ODIHR), which is responsible for elections observations, legislative reviews, and 
also advisory support on democratic processes and human rights, has been closely 
monitoring Belarus’s elections and governmental activities related to human rights.373 The 
1994 presidential elections were received by the OCSE observers as fair, with only “minor 
procedural difficulties,” a strong turnout, and balanced media coverage.374 However, 
subsequent OSCE observers’ reports have not been so positive. The 1996 referendum’s 
execution and results (discussed briefly in Chapter III) were not received well by the 
OSCE. Not only did the OSCE leadership question the legality of the referendum, but a 
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number of voting violations were registered by the observers during the referendum 
itself.375  
All subsequent presidential elections in Belarus were viewed by the OSCE, again, 
as unfair. For example, the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report from 
2010 states: 
The presidential election indicated that Belarus has a considerable way to 
go in meeting its OSCE commitments for democratic elections. There was 
a lack of independence and impartiality of the election administration, an 
uneven playing field and a restrictive media environment, as well as a 
continuous lack of transparency at key stages of the electoral process.376 
Lukashenko was dissatisfied with his Western critics. In his TV interview in 2012, 
he asserted: 
The [OSCE] organization would be needed if it had adhered to what was 
declared at its creation. The problem is that the West and the United States 
were interested in [the OSCE] when they were confronted by the mighty 
Soviet Union. Today they no longer need this organization. It is completely 
unnecessary for us too because [the OSCE] failed in its responsibilities. This 
is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The OSCE does 
not deal with security and its cooperation is focused on disintegration.377  
As presidential elections were approaching in 2015, Lukashenko made an effort to 
create an appearance of compliance with the OSCE obligations. The Belarusian 
government’s welcoming approach to OSCE observers, its peaceful campaign and Election 
Day, and the release of six incarcerated opposition figures prior to the elections, were 
positive moves noted by OSCE representatives. However, according to the OSCE report, 
“the legal framework remained essentially unchanged”; the biggest concerns were about 
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counting of votes and tabulation of election results.378 While the OSCE did not see the 
2015 presidential elections in Belarus as democratic, Lukashenko asserted his devotion to 
the will of the West: “Everything the West wished for, everything the West wished to see 
during the presidential elections in Belarus, I admit ̶ we did it all.”379  
Over the years, a number of human rights violations in Belarus have been registered 
by OSCE observers. The violations include arrests and imprisoning of civilians, journalists, 
and members of the opposition, raids on the opposition’s media and other civilian offices, 
and use of force in dealing with peaceful demonstrations. One of the most recent large-
scale examples of the human rights violations by the Belarusian government is the events 
of 25 March 2017. Peaceful demonstrations in observance of Freedom Day, involving 
anywhere between 1,000 and 3,000 people, were aggressively broken up by Belarus’s 
security forces.380 Several hundred people were detained just on the grounds of looking 
like protesters.381 Most of detainees were released after a few hours, but the pictures of 
Belarus’s security forces’ violent actions against peaceful demonstrators continued to 
circulate via social media and caused a strong negative reaction by the West and the OSCE 
in particular.  
Nevertheless, pursuing the Belarus world peacemaker policy, on 5–9 July 2017 
Belarus hosted the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly for its 26thth Annual Session with about 
260 representatives from North America, Europe, and Asia.382 The theme of the session 
was “Enhancing mutual trust and co-operation for peace and prosperity in the OSCE 
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region.” It ended with the adoption of the Minsk Declaration.383 In his opening speech to 
the plenary session on 5 July 2017, Lukashenko stated that “[the OSCE PA] is the most 
effective forum in the OSCE and in Europe in general.”384 As recently as January 2018, 
Lukashenko re-assured OSCE members of his country’s commitment and loyalty to the 
organization: “Belarus is open to discuss any concerns and questions. Belarus will continue 
to be a good pillar in the center of Europe.”385 
However, Minsk always is cautious about how Moscow will perceive Belarus’s 
active support of and participation in Western organizations. To obscure the level of its 
involvement with the OSCE, the Belarusian government issued statements critiquing the 
OSCE. For example, a controversial opinion was voiced by Belarusian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Victor Makei during his speech at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting on 07 
December 2012 in Vienna, where Makei pointed out the OSCE’s inability to provide 
security and stability in the region: “the deep crisis of European security is continuing, 
polarization is growing, trust is eroding, and challenges are multiplying.”386 Makei 
underlined the weakened political role of the organization, unresolved conflicts in 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine, and the importance of strengthening the OSCE’s 
involvement in combating growing and expanding international threats such as terrorism, 
human and drug trafficking, uncontrolled migration, and cybercrime.387  
B. BELARUS AND NATO 
Belarus’s relations with NATO, while improved significantly from the 1990s to the 
present, continue to fluctuate and depend largely on Russia’s behavior. The Soviet-era 
perception of NATO as a mortal threat has evolved into complex, but cooperative relations 
with the alliance. However, Belarus’s historical connections with Russia strongly influence 
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Belarus’s security posture and its approach towards NATO. Public criticism, intended for 
Russia, coexists with quiet cooperation with NATO, intended for the West.  
While the post-World War II Soviet vision of the “inevitability of war” between 
socialism and capitalism evolved into a more pragmatic view of the state of deterrence and 
co-existence between two systems, NATO was viewed by Soviet leaders as a military 
threat against the USSR.388 NATO strategic plans, including expansion of American 
military bases in Europe, were perceived by the Soviets as acts of aggression towards the 
USSR, not a legitimate defense.389 The military opposition between the Eastern bloc, 
including Belarus, and NATO members continued throughout the Cold War. During the 
Soviet era, NATO was perceived by the Belarusian population as a mortal threat due to 
extremely active Soviet propaganda.390 
After 1991, the new European security order included NATO as the only military 
alliance in Europe and Russia as the only state that, to some extent, could counter the 
Alliance.391 Nevertheless, in this context, Belarus plays an important role because of its 
geopolitical situation: Belarus is bordered by Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and 
Latvia, and therefore provides a natural buffer between Russia and several NATO 
members. Despite Western expectations that the post-Soviet states would turn to the West, 
Belarus was reluctant to adopt democratic ideas and kept its strong ties with Russia. 
NATO-Belarus relations did not see the significant improvements that the West had 
expected in the 1990s. Almost forty years of pro-Soviet and anti-NATO Soviet propaganda 
had taken root in the minds of the Belarusian population, including those in power.  
Between 1991 and 1994 (before Lukashenko took power), independent Belarus 
started to develop relations with NATO with positive aspirations. Shushkevich, as 
indicated in Chapter III, had nationalist views, wished for Belarus to have its own identity, 
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independent from Russia, and showed an interest in a dialogue between Belarus and 
NATO.392 Official relations between NATO and Belarus commenced on 10 March 1992 
in Brussels, when Belarus joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council – EAPC since 1997).393 Numerous meetings and visits 
between NATO and Belarusian officials took place. Meetings between Belarusian and 
NATO members’ prime ministers were held in March 1993 and May 1994 at NATO 
headquarters.394 High-ranking officials, including NATO Secretary–General Manfred 
Woerner, visited Minsk in the period of 1992–95.395 The main issues discussed during 
those meetings were “disarmament problems, confidence-building measures, conversion 
of defense industries, and civil-military relations.”396 
 Under Lukashenko, however, the relations between the country and NATO started 
to deteriorate.397 Lukashenko’s strong pro-Russian orientation precludes Belarus from 
being openly NATO-friendly. Despite the “sparks” that exist between Russia and Belarus, 
Lukashenko assured Russia that “Belarus is an outpost on the border with NATO… and it 
will always defend not only itself but also Russia, even if Russia does not assist [Belarus] 
with military defense.”398 At the same time, Belarus has adopted conciliatory gestures 
towards NATO and is involved with NATO more than Minsk would loudly proclaim. In 
1995, the Republic of Belarus, among the last post-Soviet countries, became a member of 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.399 President Clinton already in January 1994 (at 
the cradle of the PfP’s creation), during his short visit to Minsk, invited Belarus to “join 
with NATO in a partnership that will permit us together to provide for the common 
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security… I hope Belarus will give careful consideration to this Partnership.”400 
Presidential elections in July 1994 and financial difficulties were among chief reasons for 
Belarus’s hesitation and stalling.401 Belarus’s participation in the PfP was not energetic: 
the first Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program came into effect only in July 
1997; the country’s representative to the partnership was not appointed until 1998; and 
Belarus did not participate in any joint military exercises until 2005.402  
In the 1990s, four stumbling blocks appeared between NATO and Belarus: NATO 
enlargement, Belarus’s failure to meet the obligations of the CFE treaty, Lukashenko’s 
proposal for a nuclear-weapons-free zone, and the Kosovo conflict. For the first stumbling 
block, NATO enlargement, Belarusian authorities saw a potential breach of trust and 
growing tensions in international relations, increasing military expenditures, and cuts in 
social programs.403 The old Soviet fear of NATO as enemy number one and concerns of 
the political-military destabilization of Europe disturbed Belarusian society.404 
Lukashenko’s statement on 9 May 1996 highlighted the attitude of the country towards the 
enlargement: “We cannot look calmly at this terrible monster approaching the borders of 
our blue-eyed Belarus.”405  
Belarus’s hostile reaction to NATO enlargement was connected both with the 
country’s own security concerns and Russia’s strong negative position on the issue. 
Internally, the enlargement meant that Poland would become a NATO member. Since 
Belarus and Poland border each other, this would bring the potential foe right to Belarus’s 
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doorsteps.406 Sergei Kostyan, deputy chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Belarusian parliament, representing the attitude of Minsk at the time, stated, “If Poland 
joins NATO, and it will, we can become Polish lands.... If Belarus is not eager to join 
NATO and puts up any resistance, then the West will provoke a conflict in the territories 
of Grodno and Brest oblasts and after that will bring in NATO troops to defend its 
citizens.”407 In accord with Russia, Minsk supported the main Russian lines of opposition 
to enlargement, such as the direct threat to Moscow and the disturbance of the existing 
security order in Europe.408 Lukashenko showed his solidarity with Yeltsin (Russian 
president at the time) and rejected NATO’s 1997 Madrid summit invitation, when Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic were invited to join the allies.409 
The second stumbling block was the CFE Treaty’s obligations, which proved to be 
a burden for Belarus and weakened Belarus-NATO relations. Belarus’s violations included 
not only failure to comply with the CFE-established ceiling on the treaty-limited equipment 
(TLE), but also provided only partial access to the treaty’s inspection teams.410 Belarus 
exchanged almost 150 tanks to active units from about 300 that were “awaiting export” in 
1996, thus casting doubts on its export intentions.411 During some inspections, 
representatives were denied full access to the TLE holding sites.412 NATO enlargement 
and Russia’s constant complaints about adjusting its equipment limits led to a newly 
modified CFE treaty, which was signed on 19 November 1999 (still not ratified by all 
parties).413  
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The third stumbling block, NATO’s refusal of Lukashenko’s idea of a nuclear-
weapons-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe, had a negative effect on Belarus-NATO 
relations. Lukashenko sent a personal letter to NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana 
inviting NATO to join Belarus in this initiative.414 However, while Solana applauded 
Belarus for its efforts in denuclearization of the country, his overall response was that the 
alliance’s policy towards nuclear weapons precluded them from supporting Lukashenko’s 
proposal.415 Russia’s initial support waned after signing of the NATO-Russia Act, and the 
nuclear-weapons-free zone idea seems to be abandoned for the foreseeable future.416  
The fourth stumbling block was the conflict in Kosovo, in which NATO and 
Belarus took opposite sides. Even before NATO’s armed “humanitarian intervention” in 
1999, Belarus was in accord with Russia in supporting Milosevic and warning against 
military actions by NATO.417 A Belarusian delegation visited Yugoslavia during the crisis, 
offering political, economic, and technical assistance.418 After NATO deployed its armed 
forces to Kosovo, Belarus’s statements became even more hostile, calling NATO’s actions 
acts of aggression, challenges to common sense, and expansionism.419  
Despite such severe differences in interests, in practice the relationship between 
Belarus and NATO started to improve, especially after the Kosovo conflict had receded. 
In April 1998, Belarus opened its Permanent Mission to NATO in Brussels.420 Moreover, 
in November 2004, Belarus sent its representatives to attend the military committee of the 
Euroatlantic Partnership Council.421 In June 2005, a Belarusian detachment joined the 
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NATO-led exercise in Ukraine.422 In 2004, Belarus started to participate in the PfP 
Planning and Review Process (PARP).423 As a part of these evolving improvements in 
Belarus and NATO relations, exchanges of delegations started to occur on a regular basis 
to design and assess the implementation of the Partnership Goals.424 The PARP’s intention 
is to prepare Belarus’s armed forces to participate in NATO-led search and rescue, 
humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.425 
Two more initiatives highlighted improvements in relations between Belarus and 
the allies in the 2000s. First, the PfP Trust Fund project, completed in 2007, was a joint 
effort with Canada and Lithuania designed to destroy about 700,000 anti-personnel mines 
in Belarus.426  This project helped Belarus to comply with the Ottawa Convention’s 
obligations on “the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-
personnel mines and on their destruction.”427 Second, cooperation in the scientific and 
environmental fields is notable between Belarus and NATO. Belarus received about 40 
grant awards under NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme; over seventy-five 
of Belarusians scientists were able to study in NATO countries under science 
fellowships.428  
Another example of Belarus’s quiet NATO support is the country’s participation in 
NATO’s Northern Distribution Network (NDN) for NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.429 In 2004, Belarus opened its air space for NATO 
flights supporting the Afghan mission.430 Belarus, interested in participating in the 
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profitable logistics projects, extended the country’s support further in 2009–13, by 
allowing two-way transit of NATO freight (both combat and non-combat materiel) 
utilizing Belarus’s railroads.431  
In his NATO criticism, Lukashenko consistently expresses his discontent with 
NATO’s eastward enlargement and its continuous militarization. When seven more 
countries, including Baltic states, joined NATO in March 2004, almost 1,500 km of 
Belarus’s border faced NATO countries.432 Out of five neighboring states, three of them—
Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania—are NATO members, leaving only Russia and Ukraine as 
non-NATO. Lukashenko’s public reaction was aggressive and assertive. In April 2004, 
during his annual parliamentary speech, Lukashenko stated, “We have stated openly and 
honestly that NATO’s expansion is unacceptable for Belarus. We have maintained this 
position for 10 years.”433  
Lukashenko consistently promotes the idea that NATO continues its aggressive 
policy of military expansionism. As recently as 22 February 2018, during his speech at 
ceremonial meeting dedicated to the one hundredth anniversary of the Belarusian Armed 
Forces, Lukashenko asserted, “Militarization is being progressively implemented in 
Eastern Europe, where additional military contingents are being deployed. As a result, 
these countries military spending will significantly increase this year.”434 On 13 November 
2017, during the meeting with the governor of Kaliningrad, the Belarusian president said 
“Belarus and Russia are face-to-face with NATO activities along their borders.”435 In 
response, Russia and Belarus perform a joint military exercise, Zapad, every four years on 
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the borders of the Baltic states and Ukraine. Officially, the military training scenario 
features a terrorist attack on Russian or Belarusian territory and Russian-Belarus forces’ 
joint response to this attack.436 However, Western observers asserted that Russian forces 
organized a defense against a coalition of NATO states led by the U.S.437 
At the same time, Lukashenko used Zapad-17 as a tool in his balancing act between 
NATO and Russia. Moscow ignited NATO members’ perception that Russia could use 
Zapad-17 similarly in some shape or form to Zapad-13 (which was a prelude to the Crimea 
annexation) by concealing the number of participating troops and by “[menacing] NATO 
with adversarial rhetoric.”438 Minsk, on the other hand, while hosting and fully supporting 
this large joint exercise with Russia, presented Belarus as a transparent and cooperative 
ally with the West. Dozens of NATO monitors were allowed to watch the exercise, and the 
exercise locations were moved away from Poland’s and Lithuania’s borders.439 In the 
aftermath interview, Lukashenko summarized Zapad-17’s intentions: “We were not hiding 
the exercise from anyone. We showed the capabilities of the armed forces of Russia and 
Belarus in defending the Union State and the interests of our states. It really was a 
demonstration of our capabilities.”440  
Minsk’s desire to establish a balance between the West and Russia influenced 
Belarus’s historically complex relations with NATO. Minsk’s current official view on 
these relations is as “an important tool to strengthen cooperation in the political, military, 
economic, scientific and legal fields with NATO as a whole as well as with individual 
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NATO member states.”441 However, Lukashenko continues, in accord with Russia, to 
criticize NATO enlargement. Just in April 2018 Lukashenko asserted during his speech at 
the “Eastern Europe: In Search of Security for All” forum: “NATO should assume a more 
responsible position. A lot of problems we have faced, have been caused by NATO’s 
eastern enlargement. I have the right to stress it, because I have seen these developments 
with my own eyes.”442  
Nevertheless, the dialogue between Minsk and Washington, the key NATO 
member, has been recently given new impetus; in it Belarus reiterated its neutral attitude 
on the international arena. The visit of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European 
and Eurasian Affairs Aaron Wess Mitchell on 31 October 2018 gave decisive new 
momentum to Belarus-US relations.443 During the meeting with Assistant Secretary 
Mitchell, Lukashenko demonstrated Minsk’s optimistic attitude toward emerging positive 
trends between Belarus and the United States, saying that he “hope[s] the relations between 
Belarus and the United States will gradually improve,” and “promise[s] you [the United 
States] that Belarusians will be the most reliable, honest and sincere partners of yours [the 
United States].”444 Mitchell, in turn, stated that the United States is interested in developing 
economic and political relations with Minsk and that the U.S. values and supports Belarus’s 
independence and stability.445 It was noteworthy that this meeting coincided with the 
Munich Security Conference Core Group Meeting, held in Minsk on 30 October-1 
November, 2018.  
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Following Mitchell’s visit, Lukashenko met with high-profile American foreign 
policy analysts on 5–6 November 2018, highlighting nascent progress in Belarus-US 
relations.446 During this meeting, Lukashenko emphasized Belarus’s security reliance on 
Russia, but at the same time stressed the important role of the United States in European 
security. On the one hand, the Belarusian president asserted that “we are in a military-
political alliance with Russia,” reassuring Belarus’s loyalty to Russia.447 On the other hand, 
Lukashenko’s statement that “we are convinced that the security of the entire continent 
depends on the unity of countries in the region and the preservation of the military and 
political role of the U.S. in European affairs. We do not exaggerate. Unfortunately, we will 
not handle any issues, including the Ukrainian conflict, here without the US,” confirming 
the U.S. role in the European security.448  
Despite Russia’s continuous influence on Belarus-NATO relations, cooperation 
between Minsk and the allies improved significantly from the 1990s to the present. 
Belarusian officials have attended numerous meetings and conferences, conducted by the 
allies. Furthermore, Lukashenko consistently offers Minsk not only as a place for 
conferences and meeting, but also as a platform for uneasy discussions between Eastern 
and Western actors. Despite existing confrontations, Belarus’s relationship with NATO, 
including re-energized relations with the United States, has the potential for continuous 
improvement. 
C. BELARUS AND THE EU 
Belarus’s inconsistent relations with the EU, just as with the OSCE and NATO, 
have been complex since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992, and Minsk’s 
level of cooperation is determined by bilateral politics with regard to Russia.449 The EU, 
on the other hand, demonstrated its continuous desire to improve Belarus’s political 
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situation and to reform the Belarusian economic system because the organization is 
interested in a strong and competitive market in Belarus.  
Developments toward cooperation with the EU that Shushkevich had promoted 
between 1992 and 1994 were extinguished when Lukashenko took office in 1994. Since 
then, the EU has criticized Belarusian leadership as being non-democratic and even funded 
the opposition.450 Lukashenko’s November 1996 referendum was the last straw for the EU, 
and Belarus became the only country in Europe without a Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, which was established between Belarus and the EU in 1995 and frozen with 
the EU initiative in 1997.451 The EU, while it indicated its interest in improving relations 
with Minsk, always provided conditions in terms of Belarus’s continued 
democratization.452 Since Belarus failed to democratize, additional EU restrictions were 
imposed on Belarus, including a ban on top-level political contacts, a travel ban for a 
number of senior Belarus officials (including Lukashenko himself in 2006), and the 
freezing of almost all external assistance and cooperative programs.453  
Nevertheless, the EU continued to make efforts to establish positive relations with 
Belarus. Belarus was nominated as an EU European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) partner 
in 2003; however, due to the country’s continued undemocratic policies and actions, it was 
never accepted into the ENP.454 In November 2006, another attempt was made by the EU 
with the publication of an unofficial action plan “What the European Union could bring to 
Belarus.”455 The publication included both the advantages and the requirements for Belarus 
in increased bilateral cooperation with the EU.456 The unfolding energy conflict with 
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Russia at the end of 2006 complemented the EU’s warm attempt to catch Minsk’s attention, 
and contributed to changing Lukashenko’s attitude towards the EU.  
In 2008–10, the relationship between Belarus and the EU resumed and frozen 
disputes between the two thawed. After the release of political prisoners by the Belarusian 
government in 2008, the EU started a rapprochement process.457 The EU restrictions on 
Belarus, such as a travel ban on high-ranking officials, were lifted.458 Moreover, the 
European Commission opened a diplomatic mission in Minsk.459 Visits, discussions, and 
contacts by high-level politicians from both sides were reestablished and intensified.460 
Additionally, Belarus became a full-fledged participant of the EU Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) multilateral cooperation framework.461 The EaP was established in 2009 by the EU, 
and its framework includes the EU member states and six Eastern European partners: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.462 EaP developed four 
working platforms: “democracy, good governance and stability,” “economic integration 
and approximation with EU sectoral policies,” “energy security,” and “contacts between 
people.”463 Belarusian representatives take part in all four initiatives, but, at the same time, 
the cooperation is pragmatic.464 Minsk’s unwillingness to democratize its political system 
and liberalize its economy led to continued alienation with the EU. Unfair presidential 
elections and imprisonment of opposition leaders in 2010 proved Belarus’s reluctance to 
democratize, and the EU re-imposed some of the previous restrictions, added new 
economic sanctions, and even toughened the Belarusian visa ban on top officials.465  
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Another ongoing point of tension between Belarus and the EU is the death penalty 
policy. Belarus is the only country in Europe where the death penalty is still legal.466 In 
response to the EU’s grievances, Lukashenko refers to the 1996 national referendum (the 
same referendum that gave the president almost unlimited power), when the majority of 
Belarusians voted against the abolition of the death penalty: “We are called to abolish the 
death penalty. We are hearing the proposals. But not a single country can oppose the 
people’s will, the overwhelming part of which voted at the referendum for its 
application.”467 According to Article 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, 
“until its abolition, the death penalty may be applied in accordance with law as an 
exceptional measure of punishment for especially grave crimes and only in accordance 
with a court sentence.”468 “Especially grave crimes” are, according to the officials, 
exclusively premeditated murders with aggravated circumstances.469 Given the history of 
Belarusian people being destroyed over and over again during times of war (see Chapter 
II), the overwhelming support for the death penalty can be explained as a historically 
established mentality of self-defense reflected at the state law level.  
The relationship between Belarus and the EU saw slow improvements in 2012–16. 
The EU gradually reduced its sanctions, top-level official contacts resumed, and, in 2016, 
the EU lifted most of its restrictions.470 The major factor was yet another release of political 
prisoners on 22 August 2015.471 Furthermore, in 2016 the EU-Belarus Coordination Group 
was created, which made possible the cooperation at the senior officials’ level.472 During 
his meeting with EU Special Representative for Human Rights Stavros Lambrinidis, on 9 
March 2016, Lukashenko stressed that Belarus and the EU have finally abandoned head-
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on confrontation.473 The Belarusian head of state stated: “[the EU and Belarus] built an 
unnecessary wall between each other and did not even talk over this fence, just exchanged 
statements.”474 Additionally, EU-Belarus trade relations are very important to both sides. 
Recently, a Dialog on Trade was established between the EU and Belarus that facilitates 
discussion of domestic procedures, improvements in mutual trade regulations, and other 
trade concerns. Belarus’s WTO accession process resumed with the EU’s support.475  
Always uneasy, the relationship between the EU and Belarus continues to change. 
The EU’s major concerns are promoting human rights, freedoms, and the rule of law in 
Belarus, which preclude bilateral political and economic cooperation.476 In 2017, 
Lukashenko was invited to the Eastern Partnership summit in Brussels for the first time 
since 2009.477 The Belarusian president, instead, went to the Buda–Koshelevo region of 
Belarus for a long-planned visit: 
They [the EU] finally realized that there is no Europe without Belarus. The 
German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Gabriel said to me: “You 
are the center of Europe. What kind of Europe is there without Belarus!” 
But everything was planned ahead. I postponed my trip to Buda-Koshelevo 
three times already. Well, should I have to delay it again?478 
No other official explanations were given by Belarusian authorities, but some 
speculations include Lukashenko’s cautious attitude toward European politicians, 
journalists, human rights activists, and Russia’s possible negative reaction.479  
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Ironically, Lithuania complicates the constructive dialogue on bilateral agreement 
between Belarus and the EU. The issue at stake is the Belarusian nuclear power plant 
project Astravets. The power plant, financed by Russia, should be finished in 2019, but 
faces strong opposition from Vilnius.480 The Lithuanian government’s major concerns are 
safety and national security, as Astravets is located just about sixty kilometers from 
Vilnius.481 Advocating strongly against Belarus’s power plant, Lithuania, as a member of 
the EU, has ignited a political confrontation between Belarus and the EU. Beyond 
statements of opposition, Vilnius is blocking the Belarus-EU bilateral negotiation process 
by adding conditions relating to the Belarusian power plant.482  
Despite existing inconsistencies, Minsk’s internal assessment of the recent changes 
in relations between Belarus and the EU is that they are satisfactory. For example, 
Lukashenko stated that Belarus should not miss developing more favorable conditions and 
should dig deep into the European market, saying: “Further normalization of relations with 
the EU is among our most important foreign economic priorities. We must not let this 
opportunity pass.”483 Foreign Minister Makei further reiterates Belarus’s position towards 
the EU: “Minsk is ready to work on bilateral agreements with the EU. The Belarusian 
president has clearly identified a course of promoting normal relationships with the EU.”484 
Top official statements reaffirm Belarus’s interest in intensifying trading, political, and 
humanitarian relations with the EU. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The fundamentals of Belarus’s foreign policy, focused on the country’s neutrality 
and role as a peacemaker, can be drawn from Lukashenko’s speech during the EaP’s 
Foreign Ministers meeting in June 2017: “For our country, it is equally important to 
develop cooperation with the East and the West and not to make an artificial choice 
between them.”485 The cooperation between Belarus and Western organizations is based 
on mutual interests in political, economic, and humanitarian spheres, but Minsk always 
keeps in mind its Slavic roots, knowing that Belarus’s economy and security are heavily 
dependent on keeping a good relationship with Russia. 
The Crimea crisis in 2014 drew the West and Belarus closer together. For the allies, 
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, subsequent annexation of Crimea, and support of 
separatists in the Donbass are violations of international law.486 The fence-sitting by 
Lukashenko about the Russian annexation of Crimea, which was discussed in Chapter III, 
shows Minsk’s efforts not to upset either the West or Russia. In contrast to NATO’s tactical 
response of imposing economic sanctions on Russia and providing aid to Ukraine, 
Lukashenko’s regime had offered Minsk as a site for peacemaking negotiations.487 After 
hosting Russian-Ukrainian negotiations, Belarus suggested that talks on the resolution of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could take place in Minsk as well.488 Furthermore, 
Lukashenko and Belarus’s top officials are promoting an ambitious idea to host the 
Helsinki-2 process.489 All these initiatives emphasize Belarus’s international posture as a 
neutral state and a peacemaker. 
Despite the fact that Belarus’s relationships with the OSCE, NATO, and the EU are 
deeply weakened by human rights issues, progress in cooperation in the economic and 
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security spheres with all three organizations is evident. With the OSCE, Belarus, 
notwithstanding volatile rhetoric, uses the organization’s resources for the country’s 
security needs. With NATO, although careful not to upset Russia, in words maybe less than 
in deeds, Belarus’s actions point to a limited convergence with the United States and allies. 
Finally, with the EU, disagreements in the political arena have had only a limited effect on 
economic relations and Belarus’s aggressive discourse does not prevent Minsk from 
beneficial cooperation with the organization. Belarus, in pursuit of a constructive attempt 
balance between West and East that would benefit the country’s economy and security, 
and in context of heavy reliance on Russia, is moving forward in broadening economic, 
political, and security relations with the West.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
As the international security picture changed substantially with the dissolution of 
Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR, the Republic of Belarus was left with a security 
dilemma of balancing its defensive ambitions between the West and Russia. Minsk’s policy 
of neutrality and peacemaking and Lukashenko’s persistent rhetoric that Belarus is an 
“oasis of stability” have been key factors shaping modern Belarus’s posture in the 
international arena.490 Belarus has continuously sought Western support and 
acknowledgement while maintaining positive relations with Russia.   
 
A. BELARUSIAN POLICY MOTIVATIONS AND TRENDS 
Five major factors affecting Minsk’s modern foreign policy and security can be 
drawn from analyzing Belarus’s history and relations with Russia and the West. First, 
Belarus is relatively inexperienced in being a self-governing state because, as discussed in 
Chapter II, the country gained its independence for the first time only after the dissolution 
of the USSR. Second, stability and security are of high value for Belarusians, given their 
experience in multiple devastating wars. Third, as inferred in Chapter II, Belarus’s society 
is very adaptable to changes in politics, economy and social life. Fourth, as underlined in 
Chapters III and IV, Belarus pursues a policy of peace and peacemaking in both Eastern 
and Western directions. Fifth, as highlighted in Chapter III, modern Belarus’s economic 
and military dependence on Russia limits the extent of its engagement with the West.   
Belarus is a relatively young state, and the country did not acquire much experience 
in the realms of domestic governance or international relations. As discussed in detail in 
Chapter II, the country has enjoyed its independence for a short twenty-seven years (since 
1991), and its current territory for only seventy-nine years (since 1939). Before 1991, 
Belarus always had external rulers and tended to rely on other, stronger and more 
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developed states. Therefore, it is premature to expect its rapid advancement of independent 
democratic policies both domestically and internationally. Moreover, Lukashenko and his 
office are representatives of a Soviet-minded, old guard political elite. Thus, Belarus needs 
to raise a new generation of independent-minded political elites before significant changes 
to current foreign policy are likely be observed.  
 Belarus’s attachment to stability and security is deeply rooted in the country’s 
history, which is reflected in Chapter II. Only occasionally has Belarusian territory changed 
its rulers. Chapter II illustrated how long periods of governance by the GDL, the Polish–
Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian Empire, and the USSR instilled a tradition of 
maintaining a long-lasting ruling elite. This tradition correlates not only with stability, but 
also indicates perceived levels of security, both domestically and internationally. Despite 
existing tensions and disagreements between Belarus and Russia and the West, the status 
quo in modern Belarus’s governance suits, more or less, all parties involved. Both Russia 
and the West are not interested in a rapid power shift in Belarus; instead, they are taking 
advantage of its currently stable political conditions. This approach brings predictability 
and opportunities for building constructive relations, which does not prevent the West from 
encouraging Minsk’s more active movement towards democratization. 
Chapter II revealed that another distinct feature of Belarusians is adaptability, 
which brings flexibility into Belarus’s international politics. Taking into the account the 
numerous periods of war that Belarus has experienced, the nation’s survival and 
reconstruction abilities have been impressive. This flexibility and an ability to balance 
various interests and intents in foreign policy are embedded in Belarus’s history. This idea 
is reflected in Belarus’s National Security Concept, reviewed briefly in Chapter II. Belarus, 
while it values its independence immeasurably, is open to developing relations with any 
nation (if, of course, it does not threaten Belarus’s security and sovereignty).491     
Belarus’s key value “Абы не было войны” (Aby ne bylo voiny, only let there be 
no war), strongly influences both its domestic and international policies. Given its history, 
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Belarus is a survivor, and modern peacemaking attempts are ingrained in Belarusian 
identity. Chapter II revealed that Belarus’s peacemaking tradition can be traced as far back 
as the thirteenth century, when the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) was formed, which 
united different ethnicities under one rule. It is, therefore, not surprising that Lukashenko’s 
portrayal of Belarus as a peacemaker in the international arena finds strong support among 
Belarus’s society, is welcomed by both the East and the West, and is not objected to by the 
local opposition.  
Modern Belarus depends on Russia financially and militarily, which was 
elaborately examined in Chapter III. Russia has accompanied Belarus since the eighteenth 
century and, ever since, has had a significant influence on Belarus’s affairs. Belarus’s 
dependence on Russia continues to exist today, especially in the economic and security 
spheres. In the economic sphere, despite Minsk’s attempts to loosen this dependency, 
Lukashenko, unwilling to reform Belarus’s economy, continuously faces the Soviet 
economic legacy. Russia, on the other hand, does not hesitate to financially extort the 
Belarusian government when Moscow finds Minsk’s political behavior inconvenient. In 
the security sphere, as Chapter III disclosed, Belarus and Russia formed a military alliance, 
which is reflected in Belarus’s National Security Concept, and through the Union State of 
Belarus and Russia and the CSTO agreements.492 This historical legacy hampers the 
current Belarusian government’s search for geopolitical balance. 
The country’s turbulent history offers modern Belarus a number of benefits. 
Belarus’s neutrality makes the country open for proactive cooperation with both Russia 
and the West. Moreover, when faced with the problem of balancing interests, Belarus has 
the opportunity to choose and adjust its position, depending on existing conditions. 
Additionally, Minsk exploits its geographical location between the East and the West to 
advance its own interests. Finally, Belarus has the ability to constrain the country’s 
dependence on Russia’s defense through the cooperation with the West.   
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B. LUKASHENKO’S IMPACT ON BELARUS’S DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLICIES SINCE 1994 
As Chapter III revealed, after a short period of Westernization in 1991-94, 
Belarus’s government took a course toward re-integration with Russia. The chief apologist 
of this movement was the first president of the Republic of Belarus, Lukashenko. 
Lukashenko’s actions have had a major impact on Belarus’s political development. His 
governance, which has influenced Belarus’s political course as a whole and the relations 
with the East and the West in particular, can be presented by four major milestones: the 
movement towards the East, the search for dialogue with Putin in 2001-06, the economic 
wars in 2007-14, and the period of after Russia’s Crimea invasion to the present.   
1. Movement towards the East. 
Before Putin took power in Russia in 2000, Lukashenko was actively promoting re-
integration with the Russian Federation. The process of integration accelerated 
considerably after the referendum of 1996, discussed in detail in Chapter III. The 
referendum removed internal impediments for Lukashenko to implement his integrative 
agenda and, with his initiatives, the Union State of Belarus and Russia was created, the 
Customs Union was signed, and security cooperation has been strengthened significantly 
between the two countries. Minsk’s balance of interests undoubtedly shifted toward the 
East, which naturally weakened relations with the West. However, pro-Eastern politics 
were heartily supported by the Belarusian society, which, complemented by Lukashenko’s 
strict domestic politics, made it very difficult for a strong opposition to emerge and to 
generate a different course of development for the country.      
2. Search for Dialogue with Putin in 2001-06. 
Lukashenko’s and Putin’s different visions of Belarusian-Russian cooperative 
development led to the integration processes’ deceleration. Using its economic leverage, 
Russia started to suppress Belarus’s attempts at bilateral political dialogue, which 
ultimately led to the energy conflict between the two countries, described in Chapter III. 
Minsk, in retaliation, started to look for alternatives outside of its relations with Russia, 
which affected Belarus’s domestic and international policies. The national security sphere, 
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however, was an exception, as both Belarus and Russia had vested interests in the 
continued integration. Despite Lukashenko’s maneuvers towards the West, Belarusian 
society displayed no interest in a change of power as their living conditions were improving 
(Lukashenko’s impressive 82.6 percent of vote in the 2006 presidential elections is a good 
indicator, even admitting voting irregularities).493       
3. Economic Wars 2007–2014 
The ongoing economic conflicts between Belarus and Russia, described in Chapter 
III, spurred Belarus’s search for new export markets. To ensure Belarus’s economic 
security, Lukashenko was compelled to turn to the West, making Minsk’s international 
posture appear more pro-Western. For all his pro-Russian orientation, Lukashenko saw the 
necessity of promoting a dialogue between Belarus and the West, particularly the United 
States and NATO.   
4. The Period of after the Crimean Crisis to the Present 
The events in Crimea seemed to influence Lukashenko’s thinking more than Minsk 
displayed publically through its official statements. In practice, as can be drawn from 
Chapter IV, cooperation with the West, the United States, and other countries like China, 
continued to improve. These efforts brought positive results: the EU’s sanctions were 
lifted, high-level official contacts were reestablished, and Belarus got invited to various 
international forums, conferences, meetings, and events, discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
Moscow’s intervention in Crimea and Russia’s overall aggressive behavior in different 
parts of the world caused tensions in Belarusian society and created an opportunity for a 
possible shift to a more Western-oriented political course.  
Lukashenko’s fortification of the Belarus’s pro-Russian integrationist politics in the 
1990s did not conclusively destroy the possibility for the positive development of relations 
with the West. As discussed in Chapter IV, the Belarusian president is easing his rhetoric 
and is demonstrating an increasing openness towards the West and the United States. Good 
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indicators of these positive developments are Lukashenko’s recent meetings with United 
States representatives, as detailed in Chapter IV. This is not a course towards democracy 
and full liberalization yet, but more a compromise with Western demands, as a minimum 
for considering improved relations.   
While balancing the country interests within Belarus’s politics, Lukashenko faces 
the possible risk of the radical democratization of the society, which could potentially lead 
to Lukashenko’s loss of power or the loss of the country’s sovereignty, due to Belarus’s 
economic dependency on Russia. This situation poses a threat for the stability in the 
country and complicates Belarus’s political landscape. Lukashenko faces the challenge of 
carefully managing the pace and direction of acceptable change, when making choices in 
the economic, foreign policy, and security areas. For the West, however, this is a window 
of opportunity to cooperate more closely with Belarus through economic channels and in 
international organizations, perhaps building a basis for a new, mutually beneficial, format 
of relations.   
C. BELARUS’S SECURITY POSTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE WEST 
Belarus’s current security posture as a neutral and peaceful state invites deeper 
cooperation with the United States and the West. It is important to note that Belarusians 
have tended to detach the United States from the West in a negative way, chiefly because 
of their Soviet heritage, in which the United States was enemy number one. This mentality 
affects Belarus’s foreign policy and national security posture and refines its approaches to 
international security organizations. Moreover, in the light of events in Crimea, Belarus’s 
official rhetoric emphasizes the importance of the country’s sovereignty and the integrity 
of its territory.494 Finally, Belarus’s focus on becoming the world’s peacemaker is an 
attempt to establish a desired balance between the West and Russia, which provides 
opportunities for the West’s deeper engagement with Belarus.495 
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Chapter IV analysed relations between Belarus and three Western security 
organizations: the OSCE, NATO, and the EU. It revealed current progress in mutual 
cooperation, but also problems created by human rights and freedoms concerns. Moreover, 
Belarusian government attitudes and reactions towards the organizations are designed not 
to alienate either Moscow or the West. The evolving cooperation between Belarus and all 
three organizations is laying an encouraging groundwork for deeper collaboration. The 
OSCE continuously supports Belarus’s efforts in the disarmament process. Belarus-NATO 
relations, which in the past suffered in large part because the United States is a key player 
in the organization, might benefit from current positive developments in the relations 
between Belarus and the United States. Finally, the EU, despite disagreements in the 
political arena, continues to demonstrate its readiness to engage with Belarus, especially in 
the area of commerce.  
Belarus’s geopolitical location, stable government, and peace-making initiatives 
provide a good framework for further maneuvers towards the West, including closer 
interactions with the United States. However, Belarus’s direct communications with the 
United States might be perceived as a threat by Russia. Therefore, for the United States, 
the primary means of cooperation with Belarus should be through continued dialogue via 
international organizations, such as the OSCE, NATO, and the EU. Despite the high risk 
of Russia’s intrusion in the evolving convergence trends between Belarus and the West, 
Minsk is continuing to seek ways to make this cooperation with the West serve the 
country’s own interests.  
D. WHAT IS NEXT FOR BELARUS? 
Three possible scenarios are plausible for Belarus: an Eastern Ukrainian-type 
takeover, a Baltic-type independence, and a self-directed path. The Eastern Ukrainian 
scenario would be if Russia would threaten Belarus’s independence. The Baltic scenario 
would be if power moves to pro-Western liberal government. The self-directed scenario 
would be if Belarus takes its own unique course of development. 
The Eastern Ukrainian scenario involves such strong economic pressure from 
Russia on Belarus that there is nothing left for Minsk to do but surrender, i.e., to lose its 
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independence. Military intervention, while possible, is not necessary: taking into account 
Minsk’s large foreign debt and the major Russian stake in Belarusian financial institutions, 
a Russian policy of economic annexation of Belarus is conceivable. In this scenario, 
Belarus would lose its independence, more likely peacefully, and become dependent on 
Russia not only economically and militarily, but politically as well. The expected Western 
negative reaction, which could be molded from the Eastern Ukrainian experience, would 
not be an impediment for Russia’s actions. This scenario would be possible in the case if 
Minsk were to fail to find an alternative export market to ease Belarus’s economic 
dependence on Russia. Russia’s currently aggressive policy might cause the loss of security 
stability in the Eastern Europe, which, in turn, might expedite the Eastern Ukrainian 
scenario’s occurrence for Belarus.     
Opposite to the Eastern Ukrainian case, the Baltic scenario would be if a new, pro-
Western Belarusian political elite seized power in Minsk. Democratization processes and 
economic reforms would be reintroduced and Belarusian society would be liberalized. 
While attractive for the West, such a development could cause a strong negative reaction 
from Russia. The very slim possibility of a Baltic scenario succeeding would be greater if 
the changeover were to occur very quickly, Belarus enlisted Western support beforehand, 
and Russia did not have sufficient time or interest to react. But the long history of continuity 
in governance reduces the chance for the Baltic scenario. Internal factors would affect the 
probability of this scenario occurring. One factor would be that the role of individual 
Belarusian politicians might be strengthened domestically and in the international arena. A 
good candidate would be Minister of Foreign Affairs Makei, who has a political 
background and vast experience in foreign relations, enjoying a decent reputation both 
domestically and internationally.496 Another factor would be the growth of private capital, 
which is interested in the liberalization of the economy, cooperation with more advanced 
countries, and foreign currency inflows.      
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The self-directed scenario implies Minsk’s further maneuvering behavior and 
development of a beneficial balance for Belarus between the East and the West. Belarus, 
to the extent possible, would not extend its existing debt but, instead, would rely on 
investments in human capital and international commerce. A stable source of state income 
could be drawn from its own people by liberalizing and reforming the economy and 
political system, as well as from beneficial strategic and trade alliances. This liberalization 
process would not have to be democratic, however. The self-directed scenario progression 
might be similar to Russian developments, when the economy was liberalized more than 
political system. Overall, though, this would be a uniquely Belarusian course, unparalleled 
in European history. This scenario would be possible both with Lukashenko or with other, 
more pro-Western, government. The reality is that Belarus’s rapid deliverance from deep 
economic dependence on Russia is very unlikely, and Belarus would likely have to 
continue its friendship with Russia for some time. The decisive factor in the self-directed 
scenario would be the smart handling of Belarus’s external debt. Belarus foreign policy’s 
angle, as well as internal balance of power, would depend on the country’s choice of its 
principal creditors.  
The implications for the United States and the West are few with the self-directed 
scenario, and intensify with either the Baltic or Eastern Ukrainian scenarios. With the self-
directed scenario, Russian interests would not be threatened and the Western involvement 
might be minimal, which could leave Belarus relations with Russia and the West largely 
unchanged. The Baltic scenario would require considerable investment from the West, 
which would shift Belarus’s balance of interests away from Russia. If it felt threatened, 
Russia’s response could be quite unpredictable. The Eastern Ukrainian scenario suggests 
that Belarus, no longer an independent country, would be under Russia’s political and 
economic control. In this scenario, the West would lose a neutral peace-making buffer state 
and the European security landscape would be altered.       
Modern Belarus’s foreign policy and national security posture are based on the 
commitment to neutrality and peacemaking efforts. Ties with Russia and Lukashenko’s 
Soviet heritage are two major constraints that constrain Belarus’s development of closer 
relationships with Western security organizations and the United States. However, current 
94 
trends show that Minsk is getting more open to developing relations with the West, while 
maintaining prudent relations with Russia.     
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